Proxy Advisory Firms:
The Economics of Selling Information to Voters*

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Abstract

We analyze how proxy advisors, which sell voting recommendations to shareholders, affect corporate decision-making. If the quality of the advisor’s information is low, there is overreliance on its recommendations and insufficient private information production. In contrast, if the advisor’s information is precise, it may be underused because the advisor rations its recommendations to maximize profits. Overall, the advisor’s presence leads to more informative voting only if its information is sufficiently precise. We evaluate several proposals on regulating proxy advisors and show that some suggested policies, such as reducing proxy advisors’ market power or decreasing litigation pressure, can have negative effects.

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1 Introduction

Proxy advisory firms provide shareholders with research and recommendations on how to cast their votes at shareholder meetings of public companies. For highly diversified institutional investors, the costs of performing independent research on each issue on the agenda in each of their portfolio companies are substantial. The institution may prefer to pay a fee and buy information from a proxy advisory firm instead. A shareholder subscribing to proxy advisory services receives a report that contains recommendations on all management and shareholder proposals to be voted on, as well as the analysis underlying these recommendations. The largest proxy advisor, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), has over 1,600 institutional clients and covers almost 40,000 meetings around the world.

In the last years, the demand for proxy advisory services has substantially increased due to several factors – the rise in institutional ownership, the 2003 SEC rule requiring mutual funds to vote in their clients’ best interests, and the increased volume and complexity of issues voted upon, which was brought by the introduction of mandatory say-on-pay and the growing number of proxy contests and shareholder proposals. By now, there is strong empirical evidence that proxy advisors’ recommendations have a large influence on voting outcomes.¹ This influence has attracted the attention of the SEC and regulatory bodies in other countries and has led to a number of policy proposals seeking to increase the transparency of the proxy advisory industry, make it more competitive, and reduce potential conflicts of interest.

While proxy advisors have a strong influence on shareholder votes, the costs and benefits of this influence are not well understood. The goal of this paper is to provide a simple framework for analyzing the economics of the proxy advisory industry. We are particularly interested in understanding how proxy advisors affect the quality of corporate decision-making and in analyzing the effects of the suggested policy proposals.

For this purpose, we build a model of strategic voting in the presence of a proxy advisory firm. Specifically, shareholders are voting on a proposal that can increase or decrease firm value with equal probability. Each shareholder can acquire information about the value of the proposal from two sources – do his own independent research or buy information from the proxy advisor. For example, in practice, some institutions have their own proxy research departments, while others strongly rely on proxy advisors’ recommendations.² More

¹See Alexander et al. (2010), Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013), Iliev and Lowry (2015), Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2015), Malenko and Shen (2016), and McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), among others.
²Iliev and Lowry (2015) show that there is significant heterogeneity among institutions in the extent to
specifically, there is a monopolistic proxy advisor that has an informative signal about the proposal. The proxy advisor sets a fee that maximizes its expected profits and offers to sell its signal to the shareholders for this fee. Each shareholder then independently decides whether to buy the proxy advisor’s signal, to pay a cost to acquire his own signal, to acquire both signals, or to remain uninformed. After observing the signals he acquired, each shareholder decides how to vote, and the proposal is implemented if it is approved by the majority of shareholders.

In this framework, the proxy advisor provides a valuable service: an option to buy an informative signal. The presence of this option, however, comes at a cost: it reduces a shareholder’s incentive to invest in his own independent research. Since shareholders do not coordinate their information acquisition decisions and since voting is a collective action problem, a shareholder who acquires information (privately or from the proxy advisor) imposes a positive externality on other shareholders by making the vote more informed. When some other shareholders already follow the proxy advisor, this externality is higher if a shareholder acquires information privately than if he acquires information from the proxy advisor. This is because when shareholders follow their private signals, they make independent (or, more generally, imperfectly correlated) mistakes. In contrast, when multiple shareholders follow the same signal, their mistakes are perfectly correlated, which increases the probability that an incorrect decision will be made. Thus, the cost of a proxy advisor is that its presence can crowd out private information production by shareholders.

This trade-off between providing a new informative signal, on the one hand, and crowding out private information acquisition and generating correlated mistakes in votes, on the other hand, leads to our main result: The presence of the proxy advisor increases firm value (the probability of a correct decision being made) only if the precision of its recommendation is sufficiently high. To see how the proxy advisor’s presence can reduce the quality of decision-making, consider the following example. Suppose that the fee set by the proxy advisor equals the cost of private information acquisition and that all shareholders except one are either uninformed or follow the proxy advisor. Consider the remaining shareholder’s choice between acquiring private information and buying the proxy advisor’s recommendation. This choice only affects the shareholder’s payoff when the votes of other shareholders are split equally. Conditional on this event, the shareholder knows that some shareholders who did not buy which they rely on ISS. See also the Government Accountability Office report on proxy advisors (GAO, 2007) and the WSJ article “For Proxy Advisers, Influence Wanes,” May 22, 2013.
the proxy advisor’s recommendation voted against it. However, because these shareholders are uninformed, the shareholder does not infer any additional information about the informativeness of the proxy advisor’s recommendation. Hence, the shareholder’s privately optimal choice of which signal to acquire depends entirely on which of the two signals is a priori more precise and does not depend on how many other shareholders already follow the proxy advisor. In particular, the shareholder finds it optimal to acquire the proxy advisor’s signal as long as it is more precise than the private signal. However, if the proxy advisor’s signal is only marginally more precise, the voting outcome would be more efficient if many shareholders followed their private signals, since the mistakes in their votes would be less correlated. Thus, there is inefficient overreliance on the proxy advisor’s recommendations.

The fact that the proxy advisor sets its fee strategically, aiming to maximize its own profits rather than the informativeness of voting, creates inefficiency of another sort. In our model, when the proxy advisor’s information is imprecise, firm value would be maximized if its recommendations could be made prohibitively costly, in order to maximize shareholders’ incentives to invest in independent research. In contrast, when the proxy advisor’s information is sufficiently precise, firm value would be maximized if the price of its recommendations could be made as low as possible, at the level that just compensated the proxy advisor for the cost of producing information. Clearly, neither of these policies corresponds to what the monopolistic proxy advisor finds optimal to do. When the proxy advisor’s information is imprecise, it charges low fees in order to induce shareholders to buy its recommendation. This crowds out private information production and leads to overreliance on the proxy advisor’s recommendations. In contrast, when the proxy advisor’s information is very precise, it becomes underused: to maximize profits, the monopolistic proxy advisor rations it and sells it to only a fraction of investors. Interestingly, because of this strategic pricing, informativeness of voting sometimes goes down even if the proxy advisor’s information is perfectly precise, as long as the quality of decision-making without the advisor is sufficiently high.

We use the model to evaluate the costs and benefits of several policy proposals that have been put forward by regulators, investors, and other market participants to regulate proxy advisors.³ Some of these proposals aim to increase the transparency of the proxy advisory industry. They include requiring proxy advisors to disclose the methodologies, assumptions, and data supporting their recommendations, disclose any conflicts of interest they may have,

³See Edelman (2013) and the October 20, 2010 Shareholder Communications Coalition Letter to the SEC for detailed discussions of these proposals.
and even make their recommendations public. Other proposals aim to reduce the market power of proxy advisors. Currently, the industry is very concentrated: ISS controls 61% of the market and has more clients than all of the other proxy advisors combined, and the second largest proxy advisor, Glass Lewis, controls 36% of the market. As a result, market participants have been pushing for reducing the two proxy advisors’ market power in order to lower the costs of proxy advisory services (GAO, 2007).

Interestingly, our results suggest that decreasing the proxy advisor’s market power and lowering its fees is not always beneficial: whether this leads to more informed decision-making depends on the quality of the advisor’s information. To see this, suppose that the proxy advisor’s information is not too precise, so that there is overreliance on its recommendations, but some private information acquisition still occurs. In this case, lowering the proxy advisor’s fees would encourage even more investors to follow its recommendations instead of acquiring private information, which would be detrimental for firm value. On the other hand, if the proxy advisor’s information is sufficiently precise, reducing its fees and thereby encouraging more shareholders to buy its recommendations would be beneficial. Similarly, we show that improving the disclosure of the proxy advisor’s methodologies and conflicts of interest, which we model as increasing the transparency about the quality of its recommendations, can have both a positive and negative effect, depending on the precision of its information relative to that of shareholders. Overall, our results suggest that any regulation of proxy advisors should carefully take into account how it will affect private information acquisition by investors and how informative proxy advisors’ recommendations are.

Finally, we analyze the role of litigation pressure by introducing the risk of litigation for a shareholder’s voting decisions, which the shareholder can eliminate by subscribing to and following the proxy advisor’s recommendation. We show that greater litigation pressure is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it increases a shareholder’s incentives to vote informatively by exposing him to litigation risk. On the other hand, it shifts incentives from doing independent research to subscribing to and following the recommendations of the advisor. The former effect is always positive, while the latter is negative if the signal of the proxy advisor is not precise enough. As a result, we show that greater litigation pressure is a useful tool to improve the quality of shareholder voting only if the research done by proxy advisors is of high enough quality.

Our paper is related to papers that study voting in the corporate finance context. Maug (1999) and Maug and Yilmaz (2002) examine conflicts of interest between voters, Bond
and Eraslan (2010) study voting on an endogenous agenda in the debt restructuring context (among other contexts), Brav and Mathews (2011) analyze empty voting, Levit and Malenko (2011) study nonbinding voting on shareholder proposals, and Van Wesep (2014) proposes a voting mechanism that would increase shareholder turnout. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing another important institutional feature of corporate voting – the presence of proxy advisors.

More generally, our paper is related to the literature on strategic voting in economics, which studies how information that is dispersed among voters is aggregated in the vote (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998). It is mostly related to papers that analyze endogenous information acquisition by voters (Persico, 2004; Martinelli, 2006; Gerardi and Yariv, 2008; Gershkov and Szentes, 2009; Khanna and Schroder, 2015). Differently from these papers, which focus on how the number of voters and the decision-making rule affect information acquisition and the quality of voting, our focus is on the effect of information sales by a third party. Alonso and Camara (2016), Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), Jackson and Tan (2013), and Schnakenberg (2015) analyze information provision by biased senders to voters, in the form of either communication or Bayesian persuasion. Their focus is on how the sender exploits heterogeneity in voters’ preferences to sway the outcome in his favor, while our model features no conflicts of interest between parties and instead focuses on the sale of information and crowding out of private information acquisition.

The fact that the proxy advisor sells its information relates our paper to the literature on the sale of information. It includes literature on selling information to traders in financial markets (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1986, 1990; Fishman and Hagerty, 1995; Cespa, 2008; and Garcia and Sangiorgi, 2011, among others), as well as information sales in other contexts (e.g., Bergemann, Bonatti, and Smolin, 2016). To our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the sale of information to agents who can also engage in private information acquisition. Our second contribution is to examine information sales in a strategic voting context. There are two important differences between selling information to voters and traders, which make our setting and results different from those in the literature: first, voters have common interests while traders compete with each other; second, in voting, a voter cares about the event in which he is pivotal.

Finally, on a broader level, our paper relates to a large literature on externalities in information acquisition and aggregation. This literature includes papers that examine how public information disclosure affects investors’ incentives for private information production.
(e.g., Diamond, 1985; Boot and Thakor, 2001; Piccolo and Shapiro, 2016) and use (e.g., Bond and Goldstein, 2015).\(^4\) It also includes papers that examine inefficiencies in information aggregation (Morris and Shin, 2002; Angeletos and Pavan, 2007) and information acquisition (Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009) due to payoff externalities among agents, such as strategic complementarity or substitutability between agents’ actions.\(^5\) The focus on voting makes our paper quite different from these literatures. The difference from the former literature, where the interplay between public information and private information acquisition and use works through trading profit considerations, is that the mechanism in our paper is through shareholders’ beliefs about the effect of their decisions on voting outcomes. Our mechanism is also quite different from the latter literature because in our model, shareholders do not care about coordinating their votes per se: each shareholder only cares about maximizing the value of his shares less the information acquisition costs. In addition, differently from the literature, we focus on the sale of information by a profit-maximizing seller.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setup and solves for the benchmark case of shareholder voting without a proxy advisor. Section 3 analyzes shareholders’ information acquisition and voting decisions in the presence of a proxy advisor and derives implications for the quality of decision-making. Section 4 discusses the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolistic proxy advisor. Section 5 analyzes the effects of several policy proposals. Section 6 discusses possible extensions of our basic model. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Model setup

We adopt the standard setup in the strategic voting literature (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998) and augment it by introducing an advisor that offers to sell its signal to the voters.

The firm is owned by \(N \geq 3\) shareholders, where \(N\) is odd. Each shareholder owns the same stake in the firm (for simplicity, one share), and each share provides one vote. It

\(^4\)In addition, the feature that agents can acquire information directly or via an intermediary (proxy advisor) connects our paper to theories of financial intermediation, such as Diamond (1984) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984).

\(^5\)Information aggregation is also inefficient in herding models but for a different reason – sequential decision-making by agents (e.g., Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992). Khanna and Mathews (2011) study information acquisition in a herding context.
is easiest to think about these shareholders as the company’s institutional investors: given their often significant holdings in the companies and their fiduciary duties to their clients, they are likely to have incentives to vote in an informed way and hence to incur the costs of private information acquisition or the costs of buying proxy advisors’ recommendations.

There is a proposal to be voted on at the shareholder meeting, which is implemented if it is approved by the majority, i.e., if at least \( \frac{N+1}{2} \) shareholders vote for it.\(^6\) Let \( d \) denote whether the proposal is accepted \((d = 1)\) or rejected \((d = 0)\). The value of the proposal, and thus the optimal decision \( d^* \in \{0, 1\} \), depends on the unknown state \( \theta \in \{0, 1\} \), where both states are equally likely. Without loss of generality, assume that the optimal decision is to match the state, i.e., accept the proposal if \( \theta = 1 \) and reject it if \( \theta = 0 \). Specifically, firm value per share increases by one if the proposal is accepted in state \( \theta = 1 \) and decreases by one if it is accepted in state \( \theta = 0 \). If the proposal is rejected, firm value does not change. Denoting the change in firm value per share by \( u(d, \theta) \),

\[
\begin{align*}
  u(1, \theta) &= \begin{cases} 
    1, & \text{if } \theta = 1, \\
    -1, & \text{if } \theta = 0,
  \end{cases} \\
  u(0, \theta) &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

For example, the vote could correspond to a proxy contest, where the dissident’s effect on firm value is either positive \((\theta = 1)\) or negative \((\theta = 0)\) and the proposal voted on is whether to approve the dissident’s nominees. If \( d = 1 \) (the dissident wins the contest), firm value increases if and only if \( \theta = 1 \), while if \( d = 0 \) (the incumbent management stays in place), firm value is unchanged.\(^7\)

Each shareholder maximizes the value of his share minus any costs of information acquisition (Section 5.1 analyzes an extension in which shareholders are also concerned with litigation for their voting practices). Each shareholder can potentially get access to two signals — his private signal and the recommendation of an advisor (the proxy advisory firm). Specifically, the advisor’s information is represented by signal (“recommendation”) \( r \in \{0, 1\} \),

\(^6\)While this formulation assumes that the vote is binding, our setup can also apply to nonbinding votes. First, the 50% voting threshold is an important cutoff, passing which leads to a significantly higher probability of proposal implementation even if the vote is nonbinding (e.g., Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben, 2010; Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe, 2012). Second, Levit and Malenko (2011) show that nonbinding voting is equivalent to binding voting with an endogenously determined voting cutoff that depends on company and proposal characteristics.

\(^7\)Fos (2016) provides evidence that in voted proxy contests, dissidents win in 55% of cases.
whose precision is given by $\pi \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$:

$$\Pr (r = 1|\theta = 1) = \Pr (r = 0|\theta = 0) = \pi. \quad (2)$$

For example, Alexander et al. (2010) provide evidence that ISS recommendations in proxy contests seem to convey substantive information about the contribution of dissidents to firm value. Relatedly, according to the survey of institutional investors conducted by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), 55% of respondents believe that proxy advisors help them make more informed voting decisions.

Each shareholder can buy the advisor’s recommendation for fee $f$, which is optimally set by the advisor at the initial stage. We assume that the advisor’s recommendation is simply given by $r$, so that a shareholder who subscribes to the advisor’s services observes $r$.\(^8\)

In addition to the advisor’s signal, each shareholder has access to a private information acquisition technology, whereby shareholder $i$ can acquire a private signal $s_i \in \{0, 1\}$ at a cost $c > 0$. The precision of the private signal is given by $p \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$:

$$\Pr (s_i = 1|\theta = 1) = \Pr (s_i = 0|\theta = 0) = p. \quad (3)$$

All signals are independent conditional on state $\theta$, and precision levels $p$ and $\pi$ are common knowledge.

The timing of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. There are four stages. At Stage 1, the advisor sets fee $f$ that it charges each shareholder who buys the recommendation. At Stage 2, each shareholder independently and simultaneously decides on whether to acquire his private signal at cost $c$, acquire the advisor’s signal for fee $f$, acquire both signals, or remain uninformed. At Stage 3, each shareholder $i$ privately observes the signals he acquired, if any, and decides on his vote $v_i \in \{0, 1\}$, where $v_i = 1$ ($v_i = 0$) corresponds to voting in favor of (against) the proposal. The votes are cast simultaneously. At Stage 4, the proposal is implemented or not, depending on whether the majority of shareholders voted for it, and the payoffs are realized.

This setup assumes that shareholders do not communicate with each other and hence do

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\(^8\)In practice, proxy advisors sometimes give personalized vote recommendations to clients that have a strong position on particular issues, e.g., on corporate social responsibility proposals. Such behavior would arise in our model if we assumed that shareholders have heterogeneous preferences, the feature that we abstract from in this paper.
not observe each others’ information when voting. In practice, while some communication between shareholders is possible, the extent of this communication is limited. In particular, there is a fine line between shareholders sharing their information with each other and coordinating with each other. The latter can be viewed as “forming a group” (as defined by the SEC) and requires the filing of Schedule 13D, making shareholders cautious about communicating with each other.\textsuperscript{9}

We focus on symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria. Symmetry means two things. First, all shareholders follow the same information acquisition strategy, and at the voting stage, all shareholders of one type (i.e., those who acquired the recommendation from the advisor; those who acquired a private signal; those who acquired neither; and those who acquired both) use the same voting strategy, denoted $w_r(r) : \{0, 1\} \to [0, 1]$, $w_s(s_i) : \{0, 1\} \to [0, 1]$, $w_0 \in [0, 1]$, and $w_{rs}(r, s_i) : \{0, 1\} \times \{0, 1\} \to [0, 1]$, where $w_r(\cdot)$, $w_s(\cdot)$, $w_0$, and $w_{rs}(\cdot)$ denote the probability of voting “for” given the respective information set. Second, since the model is fully symmetric in states and signals, we look for equilibria that are symmetric around the state: $w_s(s_i) = 1 - w_s(1 - s_i)$, $w_r(r) = 1 - w_r(1 - r)$, $w_0 = \frac{1}{2}$, and $w_{rs}(r, s_i) = 1 - w_{rs}(1 - r, 1 - s_i) \forall s_i \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\forall r \in \{0, 1\}$.\textsuperscript{10} In what follows, we refer to symmetric equilibria as simply equilibria.\textsuperscript{11}

We assume that shareholders cannot abstain from voting on the proposal. This assumption matches reality: in practice, institutional investors rarely abstain from voting, probably

\textsuperscript{9}For example, according to the 2011 report by the law firm Dechert LLP, “shareholder concern about unintentionally forming a group has chilled communications among large holders of shares in U.S. public companies.” Relatedly, according to the survey of institutional investors by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016), investors believe that “rules on “acting in concert” discourage coordination,” and name it as one the most important impediments to shareholder engagement.

\textsuperscript{10}The symmetry assumption allows us to eliminate “uninformative” equilibria, where all shareholders remain uninformed and then all vote in the same direction.

\textsuperscript{11}In particular, when we say there is a unique equilibrium, we mean a unique symmetric equilibrium.
because of the fear of violating their fiduciary duties or of being perceived as uninformed. For example, according to our calculations based on the ISS Voting Analytics database for 2003-2012, mutual funds abstain in less than 1% of cases.\textsuperscript{12}

The model described in this section is stylized. The benefit is that it leads to tractable solutions and clearly shows the underlying economic forces: the valuable social function of a proxy advisor in providing investors with a new information acquisition technology and the inefficiencies in the choice of information acquisition technologies due to a collective action problem. The cost of tractability is that the model does not incorporate several features of the proxy advisory industry. In Section 6, we discuss how our model can be extended to account for some of these features.

\subsection{Benchmark: Voting without the proxy advisory firm}

As a benchmark, it is useful to consider shareholder voting in the absence of the advisor. In this case, the model is an extension of the standard problem of strategic voting,\textsuperscript{13} augmented by the information acquisition stage. A variation of this problem has been studied by Persico (2004).

An equilibrium is given by probability \( q \in [0, 1] \) with which each shareholder acquires a private signal; function \( w_s(s) \), the probability of voting “for” given signal \( s \); and probability \( w_0 = \frac{1}{2} \) of voting “for” given no information.

In equilibrium, each shareholder who acquires a private signal votes according to his signal. Indeed, if the shareholder always votes in the same way regardless of his signal, he is better off not paying for the signal in the first place. Similarly, if the shareholder mixes (and hence is indifferent) between voting according to his signal and against it for at least one realization of the signal, then his utility would not change if he voted in the same way regardless of his signal, so he is again better off not acquiring the signal.

\textsuperscript{12}Moreover, the equilibrium of our model will also be an equilibrium if we extend the model by allowing each shareholder to abstain from voting and assume that in the event of a tie, the proposal is implemented randomly. Consider an uninformed shareholder and note that his vote only matters if the votes of other shareholders are split equally. Conditional on this event, both states are equally likely and hence the shareholder is indifferent between it being accepted or rejected. If the shareholder abstains from voting, the proposal is implemented randomly, uncorrelated with the state; if the shareholder does not abstain from voting, he randomizes between voting for and against and hence the implementation of the proposal is also independent of the state. Hence, the uninformed shareholder is indifferent between abstaining and not abstaining, and thus our equilibrium indeed continues to exist in this extended model.

\textsuperscript{13}Maug and Rydqvist (2009) provide evidence consistent with shareholders voting strategically.
Given the equilibrium at the voting stage, we can solve for the equilibrium at the information acquisition stage. Consider shareholder $i$ contemplating whether to acquire a private signal, given that he expects each other shareholder to acquire a private signal with probability $q$. Suppose that the shareholder’s private signal is $s_i = 1$. Whether he is informed or not only makes a difference if his vote is pivotal, i.e., the number of “for” votes among other shareholders is exactly $\frac{N-1}{2}$. Let us denote this set of events by $PIV_i$. In this case, by acquiring the signal, the shareholder votes “for” for sure, instead of randomizing between voting “for” and “against,” so his utility from being informed is $\frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta) | s_i = 1, PIV_i]$. Similarly, conditional on his private signal being $s_i = 0$, the shareholder’s utility from being informed is $-\frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta) | s_i = 0, PIV_i]$. Overall, the shareholder’s value of acquiring a signal is

$$V(q) = \Pr(s_i = 1) \Pr(PIV_i | s_i = 1) \frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta) | s_i = 1, PIV_i] - \Pr(s_i = 0) \Pr(PIV_i | s_i = 0) \frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta) | s_i = 0, PIV_i].$$

(4)

It is useful to define function $P(x, n, k)$ as the probability that the proposal gets $k$ votes out of $n$ when each shareholder independently votes for the proposal with probability $x$:

$$P(x, n, k) \equiv C^k_n x^k (1 - x)^{n-k},$$

(5)

where $C^k_n = \frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!}$ is the binomial coefficient. Using the symmetry of the setup and Bayes’ rule, we can write $V(q)$ as (see the proof of Proposition 1 for the derivation):

$$V(q) = (p - \frac{1}{2}) P(qp + (1 - q) \frac{1}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) = (p - \frac{1}{2}) C^{N-1}_{\frac{N-1}{2}} \left( \frac{1}{4} - q^2 (p - \frac{1}{2})^2 \right)^{\frac{N-1}{2}}. $$

(6)

The intuition behind (6) is simple. Consider one shareholder. Any other shareholder acquires his private signal with probability $q$ and hence votes correctly with probability $qp + (1 - q) \frac{1}{2}$; the probability of a correct vote equals the precision of the signal $p$ if the shareholder gets informed, and equals $\frac{1}{2}$ if he does not. Thus, the votes of other $N - 1$ shareholders are split with probability $P(qp + (1 - q) \frac{1}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2})$. Conditional on this event, the value of the signal to the shareholder equals $p - \frac{1}{2}$, implying that the expected value from getting

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14 In practice, the probability of a “close vote” is non-negligible. For example, Fos and Jiang (2015) document that in proxy contests, the median difference between the number of shares cast in favor of the winning party and the number of shares for the losing party, normalized by the number of shares outstanding, is 24%, and in 10% of proxy contests, a reallocation of 2% of voting rights from winners to losers could flip the voting outcome.
informed is (6). The value of information \( V(q) \) is decreasing in the number of shareholders \( N \) or, equivalently, increasing in the stake of each shareholder. This is because with more shareholders, the shareholder’s vote is less likely to determine the decision, reducing his incentives to acquire information. In addition, \( V(q) \) is decreasing in the probability \( q \) with which other shareholders acquire their private signals. Intuitively, as other shareholders become more informed, they are more likely to all vote in the same way, which reduces the chances of a close vote when the shareholder’s information becomes critical.

In deciding whether to acquire the private signal, shareholder \( i \) compares the expected value from the signal, \( V(q) \), with cost \( c \) and acquires the signal if and only if \( V(q) \geq c \). Since \( V(q) \) is strictly decreasing in \( q \), the equilibrium probability \( q \) is determined as a unique solution to \( V(q) = c \), unless \( c \) is very low or very high. If \( c \) is very low or very high, then either all shareholders acquire information or none of them do. This equilibrium is summarized in Proposition 1 below.

**Proposition 1 (equilibrium without the advisor).** There exists a unique equilibrium. Each shareholder acquires a private signal with probability \( q^* \), given by

\[
q^* = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{if } c \leq c \equiv V(1) = \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) C_{N-1}^{N-1} \left( \frac{1}{4} - \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right)^2 \right)^\frac{N-1}{2}, \\
\frac{2}{2p-1} \Lambda, & \text{if } c \in (c, \bar{c}), \\
0, & \text{if } c \geq \bar{c} \equiv V(0) = \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) C_{N-1}^{N-1} 2^{1-N},
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \Lambda \equiv \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) \frac{1}{C_{N-1}^{N-1}}} \). At the voting stage, a shareholder with signal \( s_i \) votes “for” \( (v_i = 1) \) if \( s_i = 1 \) and “against” \( (v_i = 0) \) if \( s_i = 0 \), and an uninformed shareholder votes “for” with probability 0.5.

In what follows, we assume that \( c \in (\underline{c}, \bar{c}) \), that is, the interior solution occurs in the model without the advisor.

**Assumption 1.** \( c \in (\underline{c}, \bar{c}) \), so that \( q^* \in (0, 1) \) in the model without the advisor.

The rationale for Assumption 1 is simple: we want to focus on the cases where private information acquisition is a relevant margin. If \( c > \bar{c} \), the problem becomes trivial: private
information acquisition never occurs. In this case, the advisor always creates value, since there is no crowding out of private information and a partially informed vote is strictly better than a completely uninformed one. Note, however, that given the 2003 SEC rule, an institutional investor that does not acquire any information and votes uninformatively, potentially exposes itself to legal risk for violating its fiduciary duty of voting in the best interests of its clients. Given that, it is plausible to assume that even in the absence of a proxy advisor, some private information acquisition would occur. Similarly, the case \( c < c \) is not empirically plausible because in practice many shareholders voted uninformatively prior to the emergence of proxy advisory firms.

To measure the quality of decision-making, we use the equilibrium expected per-share value of the proposal (in what follows, we refer to it simply as firm value). The proof of Proposition 1 shows that firm value in the absence of the advisor is given by

\[
V_0 = \sum_{k=N+1}^{N} P(q_0^*p + \frac{1-q_0^*}{2}, N, k) - \frac{1}{2} = \sum_{k=N+1}^{N} P(1/2 + \Lambda, N, k) - \frac{1}{2}.
\]  

(8)

3 Voting with the proxy advisory firm

In this section, we introduce the advisor and solve for the equilibria of the game, taking as given fee \( f > 0 \) set by the advisor (we analyze the fee that maximizes the advisor’s profits in the next section). We solve the model by backward induction. First, we find the equilibria at the voting stage. Next, we solve for the equilibrium information acquisition decisions of the shareholders.

3.1 Voting stage

Following the same argument as in Section 2.1, if a shareholder acquires exactly one signal (private or advisor’s), he follows it with probability one. Otherwise, the value of this signal to the shareholder would be zero and he would be better off not paying for it in the first place.

In addition, it cannot occur in equilibrium that a shareholder acquires both his private signal and the proxy advisor’s signal. Intuitively, when the signals disagree, the shareholder follows the more informative (conditional on the event that his vote matters) signal, so he would be better off not buying the less informative signal. Indeed, suppose, for example,
that such a shareholder votes “for” when \( r = 1 \) and \( s_i = 0 \). By symmetry of the equilibrium, if the situation is reversed, i.e., \( r = 0 \) and \( s_i = 1 \), the shareholder votes “against.” This, however, implies that the shareholder ignores his private signal and hence would be strictly better off if he only acquired the proxy advisor’s signal. The proof of Proposition 2 presents this argument formally. While the fact that a shareholder does not acquire both signals is a convenient feature of the model that makes the analysis tractable, the intuition behind many effects does not depend on it. We discuss this property in more detail in Section 6.

Therefore, for information acquisition decisions to be consistent with equilibrium, the equilibrium at the voting stage must take the following form: A shareholder who acquired a private signal votes according to it, a shareholder who acquired the advisor’s recommendation votes according to it, and a shareholder who stayed uninformed randomizes between voting “for” and “against” with equal probabilities:

**Proposition 2 (voting with the advisor).** In equilibrium, shareholders’ strategies at the voting stage must be \( w_s(s_i) = s_i \), \( w_r(r) = r \), and \( w_0 = \frac{1}{2} \).

Let \( q_s \) and \( q_r \) denote probabilities with which each shareholder buys a private signal and the proxy advisor’s signal, respectively. Then, the probability that a shareholder stays uninformed is \( 1 - q_s - q_r \).

### 3.2 Information acquisition stage

Having solved for the equilibrium at the voting stage, we calculate the value of information to a shareholder for given \( q_r \) and \( q_s \). Using the same arguments as in Section 2.1, we show in the Online Appendix that the values to any shareholder from acquiring a private signal and the recommendation of the advisor are, respectively, given by

\[
V_s(q_r, q_s) = \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) \left( \pi \Omega_1(q_r, q_s) + (1 - \pi) \Omega_2(q_r, q_s) \right) \tag{9}
\]

\[
V_r(q_r, q_s) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \pi \Omega_1(q_r, q_s) - (1 - \pi) \Omega_2(q_r, q_s) \right), \tag{10}
\]

where \( \Omega_1(q_r, q_s) \equiv P\left(\frac{1+q_r}{2} + q_s(p - \frac{1}{2}), N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}\right) \) and \( \Omega_2(q_r, q_s) \equiv P\left(\frac{1-q_r}{2} + q_s(p - \frac{1}{2}), N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}\right) \) denote the probabilities that the shareholder is pivotal when the advisor’s recommendation is correct \( (r = \theta) \) and when it is incorrect \( (r \neq \theta) \), respectively. The intuition
again follows from the fact that whether a shareholder is informed or not makes a difference only if the shareholder’s vote is pivotal for the outcome. First, consider (9). Since all other signals are conditionally independent of the shareholder’s private signal, the value of the signal to the shareholder equals the probability that the shareholder is pivotal (the term in the second brackets) times the value of the signal in this case \( p - \frac{1}{2} \). Second, consider (10). Now, as long as \( q_r > 0 \), the acquired signal is no longer conditionally independent of other shareholders’ votes because some other shareholders acquire the advisor’s recommendation as well. When the advisor is correct (incorrect), the value to the shareholder from buying and following the advisor’s recommendation conditional on being pivotal is \( \frac{1}{2} \left( -\frac{1}{2} \right) \) because the shareholder makes the correct (incorrect) decision instead of randomizing between them with probability \( \frac{1}{2} \). Combining these two cases gives (10).

When deciding which signal to acquire, if any, a shareholder compares \( V_s(q_r, q_s) - c \) with \( V_r(q_r, q_s) - f \) and with zero, and chooses the option with the highest payoff. The fact that a shareholder’s information is only valuable to him when he is pivotal leads to an interesting interdependence in information acquisition decisions of different shareholders. To see it, consider the relative value of the two signals to a shareholder. Dividing (10) by (9) and rearranging the terms,

\[
\frac{V_r(q_r, q_s)}{V_s(q_r, q_s)} = \frac{\frac{\Omega_1(q_r, q_s)}{\pi \Omega_1(q_r, q_s) + (1-\pi) \Omega_2(q_r, q_s)} - \frac{1}{2}}{p - \frac{1}{2}}. \tag{11}
\]

The right-hand side of (11) reflects the ratio of the precisions of the two signals, \( \pi \) and \( p \), adjusted by what the shareholder learns about the precision of each signal from the fact that the votes of others are split equally. If some shareholders follow the advisor \( (q_r > 0) \), the fact that the vote is split implies that among shareholders who do not follow the advisor, more vote against the advisor’s recommendation than with it. This fact does not reveal any information about whether the advisor’s recommendation is correct if no shareholder acquires a private signal: \( \Omega_1(q_r, 0) = \Omega_2(q_r, 0) \). However, if some shareholders acquire private signals \( (q_s > 0) \), a split vote is a signal that the advisor’s recommendation is more likely to be incorrect \( (r \neq \theta) \), since a split vote is more likely when private signals of shareholders disagree with the advisor’s recommendation than when they agree with it: \( \Omega_2(q_r, q_s) \geq \Omega_1(q_r, q_s) \). Therefore, as long as \( q_r > 0 \) and \( q_s > 0 \), the information content from being pivotal lowers the shareholder’s assessment of the precision of the advisor’s recommendation, which is represented by the second multiple in the numerator of (11). Note also that the event of being pivotal does not
provide any additional information about the precision of the shareholder’s private signal, and hence the denominator of (11) just includes the unadjusted precision \( p \).

This learning from the event of being pivotal leads to complementarity in shareholders’ information acquisition decisions in the following sense. Suppose, for simplicity, that the two signals have the same cost \( f = c \). First, suppose that a shareholder expects all other shareholders to either follow the advisor or vote uninformatively, i.e., \( q_s = 0 \). Then, according to the logic above, the fact that the shareholder is pivotal conveys no new information about whether the advisor’s recommendation is correct or not. As a consequence, if the advisor’s recommendation is even a tiny bit more precise than the private signal \( (\pi > p) \), the shareholder prefers to buy the recommendation from the advisor over buying a private signal for any \( q_r \), i.e., even if a lot of other shareholders are also expected to follow the advisor. In contrast, if a shareholder expects some other shareholders to acquire private signals, i.e., \( q_s > 0 \), then he infers that conditional on the votes of other shareholders being split, the advisor’s recommendation is correct with probability less than \( \pi \). This, all else equal, pushes him in the direction of buying a private signal over the proxy advisor’s recommendation. Thus, other shareholders’ decisions to acquire private signals induces the shareholder to acquire a private signal as well. As we show below, this complementarity leads to a multiplicity of equilibria.

Given (9) and (10), we can determine the equilibrium information acquisition strategies. If \( q_r = 0 \), the problem is identical to the benchmark model of Section 2.1, so \( q_s = q_s^* \). For this to be an equilibrium, it must be that \( V_r (0, q_s^*) \leq f \). If \( q_r > 0 \), i.e., some shareholders acquire the advisor’s recommendation, the following two cases are possible:

- **Case 1: Incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition \( (q_s > 0) \).**
  Shareholders randomize between acquiring the advisor’s recommendation, the private signal, and staying uninformed: \( q_r > 0 \), \( q_s > 0 \), and \( q_s + q_r \leq 1 \). In this case, \( q_r \) and \( q_s \) are found from

\[
V_s (q_r, q_s) - c = V_r (q_r, q_s) - f \geq 0, \tag{12}
\]

with equality if \( q_s + q_r < 1 \).

- **Case 2: Complete crowding out of private information acquisition \( (q_s = 0) \).**

More specifically, if \( q_s + q_r < 1 \), shareholders randomize between acquiring the advisor’s recommendation, acquiring the private signal, and staying uninformed, and if \( q_s + q_r = 1 \), all shareholders become informed and randomize between acquiring the advisor’s recommendation and the private signal.
Shareholders randomize between acquiring the advisor’s recommendation and staying uninformed. Probability $q_r$ is given by $V_r(q_r, 0) = f$, which implies

$$q_r = \sqrt{1 - 4 \left( \frac{f}{C_{N-1}^N(\pi - \frac{1}{2})} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

For this to be an equilibrium, it must be that $V_s(q_r, 0) \leq c$.

The next lemma describes the equilibria for all values of $f$.

**Lemma 1.** For a given fee $f > 0$, the set of equilibria is as follows:

1. If $f \geq \tilde{f} \equiv \frac{2^{p-1}c}{2^p-1}$, there is a unique equilibrium, which is identical to that in the benchmark model: $q_s = q_0^* \text{ and } q_r = 0$.

2. If $f \in (\tilde{f}, \bar{f})$, where $\bar{f}$ is defined in the Appendix, there co-exist two types of equilibria:
   - (1) equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition $(q_r, q_s) > 0$
   - (2) equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition: $q_s = 0, q_r \in (0, 1)$.

3. If $f < \tilde{f}$, the unique equilibrium features complete crowding out of private information acquisition: $q_s = 0, q_r \in (0, 1)$.

The structure of the equilibrium is intuitive. If fee $f$ is so high ($f \geq \tilde{f}$) that the cost-to-precision ratio of the advisor’s recommendation ($\frac{f}{\tilde{f}}$) exceeds that of the private signal ($\frac{c}{\pi - 0.5}$), no shareholder finds it optimal to acquire its recommendation. If the advisor’s fee is very low, $f < \tilde{f}$, no shareholder finds it optimal to use the private information acquisition technology. Finally, in the intermediate range of $f$, there exist equilibria in which both types of signals are acquired in equilibrium. In this region, there are multiple equilibria for the reason described above.

### 3.3 Quality of decision-making for a given fee

Given the equilibrium at the information acquisition and voting stages, we can compute the per-share expected value of the proposal (firm value), which measures the quality of decision-making with the advisor. Comparing it with value $(8)$ in the benchmark case allows us to examine whether the presence of the advisor increases firm value for a given fee $f$. 

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The following proposition shows the effect of the proxy advisor on the informativeness of decision-making for any fixed fee $f$:

**Proposition 3 (quality of decision-making for a given fee).** Fix fee $f$.

1. In any equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition, firm value is strictly lower than in the benchmark case.

2. Consider equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition. There exists a threshold $\pi^* (f) > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{f}{c} (p - \frac{1}{2})$ such that firm value is lower than in the benchmark case if and only if $\pi \leq \pi^* (f)$.

Proposition 3 shows that the presence of the advisor harms the quality of decision-making unless there is complete crowding out of private information acquisition and the advisor’s signal is sufficiently precise. Intuitively, this happens because information acquisitions decisions that are privately optimal from each shareholder’s perspective are not optimal from the perspective of firm value maximization, leading to inefficient crowding out of private information acquisition and suboptimal voting decisions.

To see the intuition in the simplest way, consider first the second part of the proposition, i.e., the case of complete crowding out, and suppose that $f = c$. A shareholder who decides which signal to acquire, conditions his decision on the event that the votes of other shareholders are split. As discussed in Section 3.2, because no other shareholder acquires private information, the fact that the votes are split does not add anything to the shareholder’s prior beliefs about the informativeness of the advisor’s signal. Hence, given that the two signals are equally costly, the shareholder simply compares their precisions $\pi$ and $p$. In particular, he finds it privately optimal to acquire the advisor’s signal as long as it is more precise, $\pi > p$, even if many other shareholders follow the advisor as well. This, however, is inefficient if the advisor’s signal is only marginally more precise than the private signal. Indeed, if many shareholders are following the advisor, they all vote in the same way, and their mistakes are perfectly correlated. In contrast, when shareholders are following their private signals, their mistakes are independent conditional on the state, and hence the voting outcome is more likely to be efficient.

In equilibrium with incomplete crowding out, some shareholders acquire their private signals, but their fraction is small enough, so that informativeness of voting goes down.
To see this, note that a shareholder’s private value of acquiring his own signal depends on the precision of the signal and the probability that the votes of other shareholders will be split. This probability is lower if there is a high correlation between the votes of other shareholders. However, this correlation can arise for two reasons: either because shareholders have information about the fundamentals and thus make correlated informative decisions, or because shareholders rely on the same noisy signal and thus make correlated mistakes. While the source of correlation does not matter for the shareholder’s private value of his signal, it is important for firm value: correlation in votes due to each vote being correlated with the true state \( \theta \) is more efficient than correlation in votes due to many votes reflecting the same error term (which is the case when many shareholders follow the advisor). Because of this difference, information acquisition behavior of shareholders leads to less informative voting than in the benchmark case.\(^{16}\)

Importantly, the result that the presence of the advisor can be detrimental for firm value crucially depends on the coordination problem due to collective decision-making by shareholders. If the firm had only one shareholder or if shareholders could coordinate their information acquisition and voting decisions, the presence of an additional valuable signal from the advisor would always be beneficial.

### 4 Pricing of information by the proxy advisor

#### 4.1 Equilibrium selection

As Proposition 3 shows, the result that the presence of the advisor can improve the informativeness of decision-making only if its recommendation is sufficiently precise holds regardless of the equilibrium selection. However, to have a well-defined problem of pricing of information, we need to take a stand on which equilibrium is played in the range of fees where multiple equilibria exist. As the next lemma shows, the equilibria can be ranked in their shareholder welfare, provided that we marginally strengthen Assumption 1:

\(^{16}\)To see this formally, consider the case \( q_r + q_s < 1 \). Then, the probability of a shareholder being pivotal is determined by condition \( \Pr(PIV_i) (p - \frac{1}{2}) = c \), both with and without the advisor. However, in the benchmark case without the advisor, \( \Pr(PIV_i) \) is affected by the correlation in votes due to the correlation in shareholders’ private signals. In contrast, with the advisor, part of the correlation arises due to correlated mistakes from the reliance on the advisor’s recommendation. Thus, inefficient correlation in votes due to correlated mistakes crowds out efficient correlation in votes due to reliance on fundamentals, leading to lower firm value.
Lemma 2. Suppose that $c \in (\tilde{c}, \bar{c})$, where $\tilde{c}$ is defined in the Appendix. Then, in the range $f \in [\underline{f}, \bar{f})$, all equilibria can be ranked in their shareholder welfare (expected value of the proposal minus information acquisition costs). Specifically, there exist three equilibria, with equilibrium (a) having the highest and (c) having the lowest shareholder welfare: (a) equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition and $q_r \leq (2p - 1) q_s$, given by (22) in the Appendix; (b) equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition and $q_r \geq (2p - 1) q_s$, given by (23) in the Appendix; (c) equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition: $q_s = 0$ and $q_r$ given by (13). Equilibria (a) and (b) coincide when $f = \underline{f}$.

Restriction on cost $c$ in Lemma 2 is very similar to Assumption 1. In particular, condition $c > \bar{c}$ in Assumption 1 ensures that some shareholders stay uninformed with positive probability in the benchmark case without the advisor. Similarly, condition $c > \tilde{c}$ in Lemma 2 ensures that some shareholders stay uninformed with positive probability in the model with the advisor: $q_r + q_s < 1$.\textsuperscript{17}

Given Lemma 2, it is natural to assume that when the advisor’s fee is in the intermediate range, $f \in [\underline{f}, \bar{f})$, so that multiple equilibria exist at the information acquisition stage, shareholders coordinate on the equilibrium in which shareholder welfare is maximized. Since shareholders are identical, this selection is equivalent to the Pareto-dominance criterion, according to which an equilibrium is not selected if there exists another equilibrium with higher payoffs for all players in the subgame. Thus, we impose the following assumption for the remainder of the paper:

Assumption 2 (equilibrium selection). \(c \in (\tilde{c}, \bar{c})\) and, when $f \in [\underline{f}, \bar{f})$, shareholders coordinate on the equilibrium that maximizes shareholder welfare.

Assumption 2 and Lemmas 1 and 2 imply the following equilibrium in the information acquisition subgame:

Proposition 4 (equilibrium information acquisition). For a given fee $f$, the equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is as follows:

\textsuperscript{17}By definition of $\tilde{c}$, $\tilde{c} \geq \underline{c}$, but for many parameter values, $\tilde{c} = \underline{c}$. 

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1. If \( f \geq \bar{f} \), then \( q_r = 0 \) and \( q_s = q_s^* \in (0, 1) \), given by (7).

2. If \( f \in [\underline{f}, \bar{f}] \), then \( q_r \in (0, (2p - 1) q_s] \) and \( q_s \in (0, 1 - q_r) \), which satisfy (12) with strict equality and are given by (22) in the Appendix.

3. If \( f < \underline{f} \), then \( q_s = 0 \) and \( q_r \in (0, 1) \), given by (13).

Figure 2 illustrates the proposition. In this example, there are 35 shareholders, the private information acquisition cost is 1.5% of the potential value of the proposal per shareholder, and the precisions of the private signal and the advisor’s recommendation are \( p = 0.65 \) and \( \pi = 0.75 \), respectively. When the advisor’s fee exceeds \( \bar{f} = 2.5\% \), the precision-to-price ratio of the advisor’s signal is below that of the private signal. In this case, no shareholder acquires information from the advisor, and the equilibrium is identical to the benchmark case. In particular, a shareholder acquires a private signal with probability 44.5% and remains uninformed with probability 55.5%. When the advisor’s fee is between \( \underline{f} \approx 1.6\% \) and \( \bar{f} = 2.5\% \), incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs in equilibrium. In this range, as fee \( f \) decreases, the probability that a shareholder acquires the advisor’s recommendation (private signal) increases (decreases), and the probability that a shareholder remains uninformed increases. Finally, when the fee charged by the advisor is below \( \underline{f} \approx 1.6\% \), the advisor completely crowds out private information acquisition. As the fee declines even more, the probability with which a shareholder becomes informed by buying the advisor’s recommendation (stays uninformed) increases (decreases).
Figure 2. Equilibrium information acquisition. The figure plots the equilibrium information acquisition as a function of the fee $f$ charged by the advisor. The blue line depicts the equilibrium probability $q_s$ that a shareholder acquires his private signal. The green line depicts the equilibrium probability $q_r$ that a shareholder acquires the recommendation from the advisor. The red line depicts the equilibrium probability that a shareholder remains uninformed. The parameters are $N = 35$, $p = 0.65$, $\pi = 0.75$, and $c = 0.015$.

4.2 Equilibrium price of information

In this section, we study strategic fee setting by the monopolistic advisor. The advisor maximizes its profits, taking into account how its fee affects shareholders’ information acquisition decisions. Proposition 4 implies that the demand function for the advisor’s recommendation is given by

$$q_r (f) = \begin{cases} q_r^H (f), & \text{if } f < f, \\ q_r^L (f), & \text{if } f \in [f, \bar{f}), \\ 0, & \text{if } f \geq \bar{f}, \end{cases}$$

(14)

where $q_r^H (f)$ corresponds to complete crowding out of private information and is given by (13), and $q_r^L (f) < q_r^H (f)$ corresponds to incomplete crowding out of private information and is given by (22) in the Appendix. An example of this demand function is shown in Figure 2. The optimal fee chosen by the advisor, denoted $f^*$, maximizes its expected revenues $f q_r (f)$.

Consider the unconstrained problem of the advisor, $f = \arg \max f q_r^H (f)$, i.e., the problem where the advisor faces no competition from the private information acquisition technology. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the function $f q_r^H (f)$ is inverse U-shaped in $f$ and has
a maximum at
\[ f_m \equiv \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) p \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N - 1, \frac{N - 1}{2} \right), \]  
(15)

which corresponds to \( q_r = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \).

It follows that depending on the parameters, one of the following three cases is possible. If \( f_m < \bar{f} \), which happens when the precision of the advisor’s signal is sufficiently high and the private information acquisition technology is sufficiently costly, then the advisor sets \( f^* = f_m \). If \( f_m \geq \bar{f} \), then one of the two scenarios is possible. First, the advisor could select the maximum possible fee given which there is complete crowding out of private information acquisition. This strategy is akin to “limit pricing” in industrial organization, where the incumbent sets its price just low enough to make it unprofitable for a potential entrant to enter the market. Second, the advisor could select fee \( f^* > \bar{f} \) that maximizes its revenues conditional on incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition.

### 4.3 Equilibrium firm value

Denote \( V^* (\pi) \) the expected value of the proposal given the equilibrium fee \( f^* \) chosen by the advisor. Under what conditions is \( V^* (\pi) \) higher than in the benchmark model without the advisor? The proof of Proposition 5 shows that it can happen only if the advisor chooses fee \( f^* \) that maximizes its unconstrained problem. In other words, firm value can only be higher than in the benchmark case if the advisor sets fee \( f^* = f_m \), and each shareholder acquires the advisor’s signal with probability \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \) and remains uninformed otherwise. The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the expected value of the proposal in this case is given by

\[ V^* (\pi) = \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) [2 \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right) - 1]. \]  
(16)

To compare it with firm value in the benchmark case, which is given by \( V_0 \) in (8), define

\[ \pi^* \equiv \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P \left( p_0, N, k \right), \]  
where \( p_0 \equiv pq_0^* + \frac{1-q_0}{2} \) and \( q_0^* \) is the benchmark equilibrium probability of a shareholder acquiring private information, given by (7). Intuitively, \( \pi^* \) is the equilibrium probability of making a correct decision in the benchmark model without the advisor. Then \( V_0 = \pi^* - \frac{1}{2} \), and hence condition \( V^* (\pi) > V_0 \) holds if and only if

\[ \pi > \tilde{\pi} \equiv \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\pi^* - \frac{1}{2}}{2 \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right) - 1}. \]  
(17)
Interestingly, since the denominator in the second term of (17) is below one, \( \bar{\pi} \) exceeds one if \( \pi^* \) is sufficiently high, that is, if private signals are relatively cheap and a sufficient fraction of shareholders acquire information in the benchmark case. In this case, the advisor always harms firm value, even if \( \pi = 1 \), i.e., its information is perfectly precise. Intuitively, even if its recommendation is extremely precise, the advisor never finds it optimal to sell it to all shareholders: its profits are higher if it sells the recommendation to fewer shareholders but charges a higher fee. As a consequence, many shareholders remain uninformed and hence the advisor’s information does not get perfectly incorporated in the vote. If the quality of decision-making without the advisor is sufficiently high, this effect implies that the presence of the advisor harms firm value even if the advisor is perfectly informed. These results are summarized in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5 (equilibrium quality of decision-making).** Firm value in the presence of the advisor is strictly lower than in the benchmark case if and only if the precision of the advisor’s signal \( \pi \) is below \( \bar{\pi} \) given by (17). In particular, if \( (2p - 1) q_0 > \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \), firm value is strictly lower than in the benchmark case for any precision \( \pi \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1] \) of the advisor’s signal.

Figure 3 illustrates how the equilibrium fee charged by the advisor and the expected firm value relative to the benchmark case depend on the precision of the advisor’s recommendation. Figures 3a-3c use the same parameters as Figure 2: there are 35 shareholders, the private information acquisition cost is 1.5\% of the potential value of the proposal per share, and the precision of the private signal is \( p = 0.65 \). When the advisor’s information is sufficiently precise, \( \pi > 0.84 \), it can set the fee in a way as if it faced no competition from the private information acquisition technology: \( f^* = f_m \), the unconstrained optimal fee. When the advisor’s information becomes less precise, \( \pi < 0.84 \), shareholders would acquire private information, had the advisor set the fee at \( f_m \). To prevent this, the advisor engages in limit pricing by setting the fee at the highest possible level that allows it to crowd out private information acquisition. As a result of this pricing strategy, shareholders do not acquire private information for any \( \pi > 0.64 \). Finally, when the precision of the advisor’s recommendation falls below 0.64, both types of signals are acquired in equilibrium. Figure 3c illustrates the first statement of Proposition 5 and shows that the expected value of the proposal is higher than in the benchmark case only if there is complete crowding out of private information acquisition and the advisor’s signal is sufficiently precise, \( \pi > 0.92 \).
Finally, Figure 3d illustrates the second statement of Proposition 5 and shows that if shareholders’ private signals are sufficiently cheap ($c = 0.75\%$ in this example), the presence of the advisor hurts firm value even if its information is perfectly precise.

To understand how strategic pricing by the advisor and the option to buy private signals interact, let us compare the equilibrium in our model to the equilibrium in the extreme case, where shareholders have no option to buy private signals. In this extreme case, the advisor would always charge the unconstrained optimal fee $f_m$, given by (15). Hence, if $\pi$ is sufficiently high (the right region in Figure 3(b)), then the equilibrium is the same whether or not shareholders have an option to buy private signals. If $\pi$ is lower, comparison of the two equilibria shows that the ability to buy private signals unambiguously increases informativeness of decision-making. In particular, if there is accommodation of private information acquisition (the left region in Figure 3(b)), shareholders’ ability to buy private signals improves decision-making directly by incorporating private signals into the vote. If there is limit pricing (the middle region in Figure 3(b)), it improves decision-making indirectly by forcing the advisor to lower the price of its information, which induces more shareholders to buy it. Thus, unlike the presence of the advisor, the presence of the option to buy private signals always weakly improves the quality of decision-making.

5 Analysis of regulation

In this section, we analyze three types of regulations in the context of our model. First, we study the effects of litigation pressure to subscribe to and follow the proxy advisor’s recommendations. Second, we analyze regulations aimed at reducing proxy advisor’s market power. Finally, we examine the role of transparency.

5.1 Litigation pressure

Our basic model assumes that the only reason shareholders subscribe to the recommendation of the proxy advisor is that it helps them make a more informed decision. However, another motive is that it could protect an institutional investor from potential litigation: As the former SEC commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher put it, “relying on the advice from the proxy advisory firm became a cheap litigation insurance policy: for the price of purchasing the proxy advisory firm’s recommendations, an investment adviser could ward off potential litigation
Figure 3. Equilibrium fee, information acquisition decisions, and quality of decision-making for different levels of precision of the advisor’s signal. Figure (a) plots the equilibrium probability of a shareholder acquiring the advisor’s recommendation ($q_r$) and a private signal ($q_s$) as functions of the precision of the advisor’s signal $\pi$. Figure (b) plots the equilibrium fee set by the advisor as a function of the precision of its recommendation. Figure (c) plots the equilibrium expected value of the proposal and its value in the benchmark case. Figure (d) plots the same figure but when the cost of private information acquisition $c$ is half the baseline amount. The parameters are $N = 35$, $p = 0.65$, $c = 0.015$ (except figure (d)), and $c = 0.0075$ in figure (d).
over its conflicts of interest” (Gallagher, 2014). Indeed, the 2003 SEC rule on proxy voting by investment advisers suggests that following the recommendations of a proxy advisor is a means of ensuring that an institutional investor satisfies its fiduciary duty to vote in its clients’ best interests.\(^\text{18}\)

To incorporate these incentives into the model, we consider the basic model with the following change: If a shareholder subscribes to and follows the advisor’s recommendation, he gets an additional payoff of \(\Delta > 0\). It captures the benefit of an institutional investor from protecting itself against litigation. Since the likelihood of litigation can be affected by regulation, the effect of \(\Delta\) can be interpreted as the effect of a change in regulatory pressure or litigation risk.

Given \(q_r\) and \(q_s\), the gross value to a shareholder from acquiring a private signal and the recommendation of the advisor is \(V_s(q_r, q_s)\) and \(V_r(q_r, q_s) + \Delta\), respectively. As before, the value from staying uninformed is zero. Therefore, for a fixed fee \(f\), the game is identical to the subgame of the basic model with fee \(f - \Delta\). The equilibrium probability that a shareholder buys and follows the advisor is therefore given by \(q_r(f - \Delta)\), where \(q_r(\cdot)\) is given by (14). Specifically, if \(f < f + \Delta\), the equilibrium features complete crowding out of private information acquisition (\(q_r = q_r^H(f - \Delta)\) and \(q_s = 0\)), while if \(f \in [f + \Delta, f + \Delta]\), it features incomplete crowding out (\(q_r = q_r^L(f - \Delta)\) and \(q_s > 0\)). Since \(q_r(\cdot)\) is decreasing in fee \(f\), for any fee \(f\), the demand for the advisor’s recommendation is higher than in the basic model. The advisor responds to the increased demand by increasing its fee.

The next proposition summarizes the effect of an increase in regulatory pressure \(\Delta\) on the informativeness of decision-making:

**Proposition 6 (litigation pressure).** A marginal increase in \(\Delta\):

1. decreases firm value if the equilibrium features incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition (i.e., equilibrium fee exceeds \(f + \Delta\));

2. does not affect firm value if the equilibrium features complete crowding out of private information acquisition and limit pricing (i.e., equilibrium fee equals \(f + \Delta\));

\(^{18}\)Specifically, the rule states that “an adviser could demonstrate that the vote was not a product of a conflict of interest if it voted client securities, in accordance with a pre-determined policy, based upon the recommendations of an independent third party” (emphasis added).
3. increases firm value if the equilibrium features complete crowding out of private information acquisition and unconstrained maximization (i.e., equilibrium fee is below $f + \Delta$).

Proposition 6 suggests that greater litigation pressure is a delicate issue. It increases the demand for the advisor’s recommendation for any quality of the advisor’s recommendation, which has two effects. On the one hand, it increases the incentives to vote informatively. On the other hand, it shifts the incentives from doing proprietary research to following the advisor’s recommendations. As a consequence, the total effect on the quality of decision-making depends on the quality of the advisor’s information. As the basic model shows, if the quality is low, there is overreliance on the advisor’s recommendation and inefficient crowding out of private information production. In this case, higher regulatory pressure leads to even more inefficient crowding out of private information production, which reduces the quality of decision-making. In contrast, if the quality of the advisor’s recommendation is high, there is underreliance on the advisor’s recommendation, because the profit-maximizing advisor prices information so as not to sell it to all shareholders. In this case, greater regulatory pressure increases the quality of decision-making by increasing the fraction of shareholders who follow the advisor instead of voting uninformatively.

5.2 Restricting the advisor’s market power

It is frequently argued that proxy advisory firms, in particular ISS, have too much market power. Indeed, the proxy advisory industry is dominated by two players, ISS and Glass Lewis, who together control 97% of the market in terms of their clients’ equity assets, with ISS controlling 61% of the market. As a result, proposals to restrict proxy advisors’ market power have been widely discussed (e.g., GAO, 2007; Edelman, 2013). For example, according to the Government Accountability Office report (GAO, 2007), institutional investors believe that reducing ISS’s market power could help negotiate better prices with ISS and overall reduce the costs of proxy voting advice.

We can study the costs and benefits of these proposals within our model. In particular, consider the effect of a marginal reduction in the fee charged by the advisor from the equilibrium $f^*$ to a lower level. As the next proposition shows, whether such a reduction in market power is beneficial depends on the equilibrium information acquisition decisions by sharehold-
ers, and in particular, on how much private information they acquire. To see this, suppose, first, that given the equilibrium fee $f^*$, shareholders do not acquire any private information. In this case, it is optimal (for the quality of decision-making) that more shareholders rely on the advisor, since following the advisor dominates uninformed voting. Therefore, if complete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs in equilibrium, a marginal reduction of the advisor’s fee increases the informativeness of voting. In contrast, if the equilibrium features incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition, a reduction in the advisor’s fee has a negative effect of crowding out some of this private information acquisition. By the same logic as in Proposition 3, this is inefficient and lowers the quality of decision-making. The following result formalizes these arguments:

**Proposition 7 (restricting market power).** A marginal reduction in the advisor’s fee increases firm value if equilibrium features complete crowding out of private information acquisition, but decreases firm value if equilibrium features incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition.

Proposition 7 implies that restricting the advisor’s market power will lead to more informative voting only if the advisor’s information is sufficiently precise. In contrast, if the advisor’s information is imprecise, decreasing its market power will lower the quality of decision-making because it will lead to even greater overreliance on the advisor’s recommendations.

The next proposition illustrates this intuition by answering a related question: If one could choose the fee that the advisor charges for its recommendations, what fee would maximize firm value? Consistent with the arguments above, if the advisor’s information is not too precise, it would be optimal to make its recommendations prohibitively expensive to deter shareholders from buying them all together (Lemma 1 implies that any fee $f \geq \tilde{f}$ would achieve this). In contrast, if the advisor’s information is sufficiently precise, it would be optimal to set the fee at the lowest possible level to encourage as many shareholders as possible to buy the advisor’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19}We obtain Proposition 8 under the simplifying assumption that the advisor is endowed with information, i.e., that we do not need to satisfy the advisor’s participation constraint. If the advisor has a cost $c_A > 0$ of producing its recommendation, a similar result holds, but with a different cutoff $\tilde{\pi}^*$ and the optimal fee $f_{opt}$ that just compensates the advisor for producing its recommendation when $\pi \leq \tilde{\pi}^*$.
Proposition 8 (fee that maximizes firm value). Let $f_{opt}$ be the fee that maximizes firm value. Then $f_{opt} \geq \tilde{f}$ if $\pi \leq \pi^*$, and $f_{opt}$ is arbitrarily close to zero if $\pi > \pi^*$, where $\pi^* \equiv \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}+1}^{N} P(pq_0^* + \frac{1-q_0^*}{2}, N, k)$ and $q_0^*$ is given by (7).

This analysis also suggests that the entry of a new firm into the proxy advisory industry need not necessarily lead to more informative voting outcomes. On the one hand, the entry of a new advisor adds new information and can also increase the incumbent’s incentive to invest in the quality of its recommendations. For example, the evidence in Li (2016) suggests that the entry of Glass Lewis alleviated the pro-management bias of ISS recommendations, which could be interpreted as an increase in $\pi$ in our model. On the other hand, new entry also lowers the equilibrium fees, which can be harmful if the equilibrium features overreliance on the advisor’s recommendations, that is, if the quality of its recommendations is low. Depending on the form of competition and the amount of new information the new entrant adds, the negative effect may dominate. Thus, the overall effect of competition depends on whether competition occurs in price or in quality and on how precise the incumbents’ recommendations are.

5.3 Disclosing the quality of the advisor’s recommendations

Another frequently discussed policy is to increase the transparency of proxy advisors’ methodologies and procedures to make it easier for investors to evaluate the quality of their recommendations. This includes both disclosure of potential conflicts of interest (which might arise if the proxy advisor provides consulting services to corporations) and disclosure of assumptions and sources of information underlying their recommendations. For example, the 2010 SEC concept release on the U.S. proxy system puts forward a proposal that would require proxy advisors to “provide increased disclosure regarding the extent of research involved with a particular recommendation and the extent and/or effectiveness of its controls and procedures in ensuring the accuracy of issuer data.” With respect to conflicts of interest, the 2014 SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 20 requires that proxy advisors disclose potential conflicts of interest to their existing clients, but many market participants push for further regulation, which would require conflicts of interests to be disclosed to the broader public.

In this section, we examine the potential effects of such proposals in the context of our model. Specifically, consider the following modification of our baseline setting. The actual
precision of the advisor’s signal can be high or low, $\pi \in \{\pi_l, \pi_h\}$, $\pi_l < \pi_h$, with probabilities $\mu_l$ and $\mu_h$, $\mu_h + \mu_l = 1$. For example, $\pi = \pi_l$ can capture the precision of the advisor’s signal for companies where it has conflicts of interest, while $\pi = \pi_h$ can capture the higher precision for companies where it has no conflicts of interest. Let $\bar{\pi} \equiv \mu_l \pi_l + \mu_h \pi_h$ denote the expected precision of the signal.

We compare the quality of decision-making in two regimes – when the precision of the advisor’s signal is publicly disclosed and when it remains unknown to the shareholders. If the precision of the advisor’s signal is disclosed, the timing of the game is as follows. First, precision $\pi \in \{\pi_l, \pi_h\}$ is realized and learned by all parties. Then, the advisor decides on the fee it charges for its recommendation. After that, shareholders non-cooperatively decide what signals to acquire and how to vote. If the precision of the advisor’s signal is not disclosed, the timing of the game is identical to that in the previous sections: The advisor sets the fee it charges, shareholders decide what signal to acquire, not knowing whether $\pi = \pi_l$ or $\pi = \pi_h$, and then decide how to vote. The proof of Proposition 9 shows that the equilibrium in this game coincides with the equilibrium of the basic model for $\pi = \bar{\pi}$.

We make a simplifying assumption that uncertainty about the precision of the advisor’s signal is rather high:

**Assumption 3 (high precision uncertainty).** $\pi_l = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\pi_h$ is such that complete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs in equilibrium of the basic model with $\pi = \pi_h$.

Assumption 3 implies that if the quality of the advisor’s information is low, its signal is completely uninformative. Clearly, if shareholders know that the advisor’s signal is pure noise, no shareholder buys it, and the equilibrium is identical to the benchmark model without the advisor. In contrast, if the quality of the advisor’s information is high and shareholders know about it, no shareholder acquires private information.

The next proposition gives sufficient conditions under which disclosure improves the quality of decision-making:

**Proposition 9 (disclosure of precision).** Firm value is strictly higher when the precision of the advisor’s signal is disclosed if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:

1. $V^*(\pi_h) > V_0$, i.e., firm value is higher with the advisor than without when $\pi = \pi_h$; or
2. Complete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs when \( \pi = \bar{\pi} \).

The intuition is as follows. Disclosing the precision of the advisor’s recommendations allows shareholders to tailor their information acquisition decisions to the quality of the recommendations: shareholders do not acquire the advisor’s recommendations if \( \pi = \frac{1}{2} \) and do not acquire private information if \( \pi = \pi_h \). Under the first condition in Proposition 9, such tailored information acquisition decisions are rather efficient: they ensure that the advisor’s recommendations do not affect the vote when they are uninformative, and that they have a relatively large effect on the vote when they are sufficiently informative \( (V^*(\pi_h) > V_0) \). Hence, disclosure leads to more informed voting decisions than if shareholders made their decisions based on the average precision \( \bar{\pi} \) and sometimes relied on the advisor’s recommendations when they are completely uninformative. A similar argument applies under the second condition in Proposition 9: without disclosure, shareholders do not acquire private information and completely rely on the advisor’s recommendations, even though they are sometimes uninformative. In contrast, with disclosure, shareholders perform independent research when the advisor’s recommendations are uninformative, leading to more informed voting decisions.

Interestingly, however, disclosing the precision of the advisor’s recommendations does not always improve the quality of decision-making: Disclosure may encourage even stronger crowding out of private information acquisition and decrease firm value. To see this, consider the numerical example of Figure 3 and suppose that \( \pi_l = \frac{1}{2}, \pi_h = 0.7, \) and \( \mu_l = \mu_h = \frac{1}{2} \), so that \( \bar{\pi} = 0.6 \). Without disclosure, expected firm value is given by \( V^*(0.6) \), which, as Figure 3c demonstrates, is very close to value \( V_0 \) in the benchmark case without the advisor. This is because the expected precision of the advisor’s signal is sufficiently low, so that there is relatively little crowding out of private information acquisition. In contrast, with disclosure, expected firm value is the average of \( V_0 \) and \( V^*(0.7) \), and this average is lower than \( V^*(0.6) \). Thus, in this example, disclosure makes voting decisions less informed and decreases firm value. The reason is that when \( \pi = \pi_h \), the advisor’s recommendations are not precise enough to improve decision-making but are sufficiently precise to completely crowd out private information acquisition. This inefficient crowding out of private information when \( \pi = \pi_h \) is detrimental for firm value, and even the more efficient decision-making when \( \pi = \pi_l \) is not sufficient to counteract its negative effect.
6 Discussion of assumptions and robustness

Our basic model is stylized and omits several features of the proxy advisory industry. In this section we discuss how it can be enriched to account for these features.

**Correlated mistakes in private signals.** The basic model assumes that private signals are independent conditional on the state, i.e., $\text{corr}(s_i, s_j|\theta) = 0$. Thus, voting mistakes of shareholders that follow private signals are uncorrelated. It is, of course, possible that shareholders could make correlated mistakes, since their signals can be based on similar sources of information. Thus, a more general model would feature private signals with positive conditional correlation, i.e., $\text{corr}(s_i, s_j|\theta) > 0$. However, as long as this correlation is imperfect, i.e., $\text{corr}(s_i, s_j|\theta) < 1$, this model would feature exactly the same trade-offs and, we conjecture, the same qualitative results.

**Endogenous precision of the advisor’s signal** $\pi$. In the basic model, precision $\pi$ of the advisor’s signal is an exogenous parameter. A natural extension would be to introduce a stage, preceding the basic model, at which the advisor endogenously decides on precision $\pi$, maximizing expected revenues from selling its signal minus a convex cost $c(\pi)$. Since our basic model is a subgame of this model, the analysis and implications would be identical, and the comparative statics in $\pi$ would map into the comparative statics in the cost function $c(\pi)$. An important difference is that endogeneity of $\pi$ can be important for the analysis of regulation, since it introduces another dimension through which regulation affects informativeness of voting. For example, greater litigation pressure, analyzed in Section 5.1, can have another negative effect: by making the demand for the advisor’s recommendations less sensitive to their informativeness, greater litigation pressure can reduce the advisor’s incentives to invest in the quality of its research.

**Possibility of getting the advisor’s recommendation for free.** In practice, recommendations of proxy advisors sometimes leak into the press, especially on high profile cases. As a consequence, in principle, a shareholder can sometimes “buy” the advisor’s recommendation without paying the subscription fee. Since our main result holds for any positive fee $f$, even infinitesimally positive (see Proposition 3), many implications of the model with possible leakage will be similar to our basic model.

It is also worth noting that many institutions subscribe to proxy advisors’ services because in addition to getting the recommendation per se, the proxy advisor provides them with a detailed research report that aggregates the information necessary to make the decision and
provides the arguments underlying the final binary recommendation. This possibility can be captured in an extension of the model in which the advisor’s research report consists of a continuous signal \( r_1 \in (-\infty, \infty) \) and a binary recommendation \( r_2 = I \{ r_1 > 0 \} \), where \( I(\cdot) \) is an indicator function. While the binary recommendation can be obtained without paying the fee, a shareholder must pay the fee to get the continuous signal. Thus, the shareholder’s value from subscribing to the advisor’s research can be positive even if the binary recommendation is always available for free.

**Possibility of acquiring both signals in equilibrium.** In equilibrium of our model, no shareholder acquires both the recommendation from the advisor and a private signal. In practice, some large institutional investors both subscribe to proxy advisors’ services and do their own proprietary research. The likely reason is that a shareholder’s cost of producing private information and the precision of this information relative to that of the advisor’s differs across proposals, depending on the type of the proposal and the shareholder’s knowledge of the company. Because shareholders cannot buy the advisor’s recommendations selectively, for a subset of proposals (proxy advisors sell their research on all firms and issues as a bundle), we see shareholders that both establish their own proxy research departments and subscribe to proxy advisors’ services. Our model could be extended to capture this feature by introducing two proposals, such that some shareholders would pay the fee for the bundle of two recommendations but would only follow the recommendation for one of the proposals. Such a model would feature the same forces as our basic model: the advisor’s presence would crowd out private information acquisition on those proposals for which shareholders would do private research without the advisor.

**Complementarity between signals.** Another feature of our simple binary information structure is that signals are substitutes: the value of \( s_i \) to an uninformed shareholder is higher than its value to a shareholder who buys \( r \). With different information structures, signals can be complements: knowledge of \( r \) may increase the value of \( s_i \) to a shareholder. A model in which there is some complementarity between \( r \) and \( s_i \) will have an additional force, which goes in the direction of the advisor “crowding in” private information acquisition and, if complementarity is very strong, can outweigh the “crowding out” force we study in the paper. Since this effect of complementarity is well-known from other models of information

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20 For example, the length of research reports of ISS on high-profile M&A cases and proxy contests is about 20-30 pages, which, of course, provides much more information than a binary recommendation. See [https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/governance-advisory-services/special-situations-research/](https://www.issgovernance.com/solutions/governance-advisory-services/special-situations-research/).
acquisition and since there is no a priori reason why information provided by the proxy advisor and private information collected by shareholders are complements in practice, we only acknowledge it here.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we provide a simple framework for analyzing the impact of proxy advisors on shareholder voting. In our model, a monopolistic advisor (proxy advisory firm) offers to sell its information (vote recommendations) to voters (shareholders) for a fee, and voters non-cooperatively decide whether to engage in private information production and/or buy the advisor’s recommendation, and how to cast their votes. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, the proxy advisor’s presence increases firm value only if the quality of its recommendations is sufficiently high. Second, if it is not sufficiently high, there is overreliance on the advisor’s recommendations relative to the degree that would maximize firm value. Finally, if the information of the advisor is very precise, there is under-reliance on its signal: because of market power, the advisor rations its information to maximize profits.

We also examine the effects of several proposals that have been put forward to regulate the proxy advisory industry. First, we show that increasing litigation pressure increases incentives of shareholders to vote informatively but shifts them from doing independent research to following the proxy advisor. As a consequence, increasing litigation pressure improves the quality of decision-making only if the proxy advisor’s recommendations are sufficiently precise. Second, restricting the advisor’s market power improves the quality of decision-making if its information is of high quality, but leads to greater overreliance on it and lowers firm value if it is of low-quality. Finally, higher transparency about the quality of the advisor’s recommendations does not unambiguously improve the quality of decision-making.

Several extensions of our model can be fruitful. First, it is natural to extend the model to allow for conflicts of interest among different shareholders and/or for a biased proxy advisor. Second, allowing for heterogeneity of shareholders in their voting power can lead to additional effects. Finally, it can be interesting to examine the optimal voting rules in this framework. Since extending the model in these directions is not straightforward, we leave them for future research.
References


Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1.

Fix probability $q$ with which each shareholder $i$ acquires a private signal $s_i$. In the Online Appendix, we prove that for any $q$, the equilibrium $w_s(0) = 0$, $w_s(1) = 1$, and $w_0 = \frac{1}{2}$ exists (as argued before, this is the only possible equilibrium at the voting stage because otherwise information would have zero value and acquiring it would be suboptimal).

Next, consider shareholder $i$’s value from becoming informed. Conditional on the shareholder’s private signal being $s_i = 1$, whether he is informed or not only makes a difference if the number of “for” votes among other shareholders is exactly $\frac{N-1}{2}$. Let us denote this set of events by $PIV_i$. In this case, by acquiring the signal, the shareholder votes “for” for sure, instead of randomizing between voting “for” and “against,” so his utility from being informed is $\frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 1, PIV_i]$. Similarly, conditional on his private signal being $s_i = 0$, the shareholder’s utility from being informed is $-\frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 0, PIV_i]$. Overall, the shareholder’s value of acquiring a private signal is

$$V(q) = \Pr(s_i = 1) \Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 1) \frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 1, PIV_i] - \Pr(s_i = 0) \Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 0) \frac{1}{2} E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 0, PIV_i].$$

By the symmetry of the setup and strategies, $E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 1, PIV_i] = -E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 0, PIV_i]$ and $\Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 1) = \Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 0)$, so we get

$$V(q) = \frac{1}{2} \Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 1) E[u(1, \theta)|s_i = 1, PIV_i] = \frac{1}{2} \Pr(PIV_i|s_i = 1) \Pr[\theta = 1|s_i = 1, PIV_i] = \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\theta = 1, PIV_i, s_i = 1] - \Pr[\theta = 0, PIV_i, s_i = 1] = \frac{1}{2} p \Pr[PIV_i|\theta = 1] - \frac{1}{2} (1-p) \Pr[PIV_i|\theta = 0]$$

Conditional on $\theta = 1$, other shareholders make their voting decisions independently and vote “for” with probability $qp + \frac{1}{2} (1 - q) = \frac{1}{2} + q (p - \frac{1}{2})$. Hence,

$$\Pr[PIV_i|\theta = 1] = C^{\frac{N-1}{2}} \left( \frac{1}{2} + q(p - \frac{1}{2}) \right)^{\frac{N-1}{2}} \left( \frac{1}{2} - q(p - \frac{1}{2}) \right)^{\frac{N-1}{2}}.$$  

Noting that $\Pr[PIV_i|\theta = 1] = \Pr[PIV_i|\theta = 0]$ gives (6). Note that $V(q)$ decreases in $q$. Since $P(x, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2})$ decreases in $N$ for any $x$, it follows that $V(q)$ decreases in $N$.

In deciding whether to acquire the private signal, shareholder $i$ compares the expected value of his signal $V(q)$ with cost $c$. Since $V(q)$ is strictly decreasing in $q$, there are three possible cases. If $c < \tilde{c} \equiv V(1)$, then each shareholder acquires information regardless of $q$. Hence, in the unique equilibrium all shareholders acquire private signals: $q^* = 1$. If $c > \tilde{c} \equiv V(0)$, then each shareholder is better off not acquiring information regardless of $q$. Hence, in the unique equilibrium all shareholders remain uninformed: $q^* = 0$. Finally, if $c \in [\tilde{c}, \tilde{c}]$, then $q^*$ is given as the solution to $V(q^*) = c$. Plugging (6) and rearranging the terms, we get (7).

Finally, we derive the equilibrium firm value given $q^*_0$:

$$V_0 = \Pr(\theta = 1) \sum_{k = \frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(q_0^* p + \frac{1 - q_0^*}{2}, N, k) - \Pr(\theta = 0) \sum_{k = \frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(q_0^*(1-p) + \frac{1 - q_0^*}{2}, N, k)$$

$$= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k = \frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k = \frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda, N, N - k \right) = \sum_{k = \frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left[ \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda, N, k \right] - \frac{1}{2},$$

where we used $\sum_{k=0}^{N} P(q, N, k) = 1$.  

40
Proof of Proposition 2.

Let us prove that there is no equilibrium in which a shareholder acquires both signals with positive probability. By contradiction, suppose such an equilibrium exists and consider a shareholder with both signals, \( r \) and \( s_i \). Consider a realization \( r = 1 \) and \( s_i = 0 \). There are three possibilities: \( w_{rs} (1, 0) = 1 \), \( w_{rs} (1, 0) = 0 \), and \( w_{rs} (1, 0) \in (0, 1) \). First, if \( w_{rs} (1, 0) = 1 \), then it must be that \( w_{rs} (1, 1) = 1 \) because the shareholder’s posterior that \( \theta = 1 \) is strictly higher in this case. By symmetry, \( w_{rs} (0, 1) = 1 - w_{rs} (1, 0) = 0 \). In turn, \( w_{rs} (0, 1) = 0 \) implies \( w_{rs} (0, 0) = 0 \), since the shareholder’s posterior that \( \theta = 1 \) is strictly lower in this case. It follows that \( v_i = r \), and hence the shareholder would be better off if he acquired only the advisor’s signal. Second, if \( w_{rs} (1, 0) = 0 \), then it must be that \( w_{rs} (0, 0) = 0 \). By symmetry, \( w_{rs} (0, 1) = 1 - w_{rs} (1, 0) = 1 \), and hence \( w_{rs} (1, 1) = 1 \). It follows that \( v_i = s_i \), and hence the shareholder would be better off if he only acquired the private signal. Finally, if \( w_{rs} (1, 0) \in (0, 1) \), then by symmetry \( w_{rs} (0, 1) = 1 - w_{rs} (1, 0) \in (0, 1) \). Hence, when \( r \neq s_i \), the shareholder is indifferent between voting \( v_i = r \) and \( v_i = s_i \). Hence, the shareholder would be better off if he only acquired one signal of the two.

The arguments in the text preceding Proposition 2 complete the proof. In the Online Appendix, we derive the condition under which equilibrium \( w_s (s_i) = s_i \), \( w_r (r) = r \), and \( w_0 = \frac{1}{2} \) will exist for any possible sub-game. However, whenever this condition is violated, this sub-game features zero value of recommendation of the advisor, and hence is not reached on equilibrium path if \( q_r > 0 \).

Proof of Lemma 1. To prove the lemma, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for each type of equilibrium to exist.

1. Equilibrium with only private information acquisition. First, consider the case of \( q_r = 0 \). In this case, a shareholder’s choice between buying a private signal and staying uninformed is identical to the situation in which there is no advisor, covered in Proposition 1. Hence, \( q_s = q_s^0 \in (0, 1) \). Pair \( (q_r, q_s) = (0, q_s^0) \) is an equilibrium if and only if no shareholder would be better off deviating to buying recommendation from the advisor: \( V_r (0, q_s^0) \leq f \). Since \( \Omega_1 (0, q_s^0) = \Omega_2 (0, q_s^0) = \frac{c}{p - 0.5} \) (the latter by indifference \( V_s (0, q_s^0) = c \)), \( V_r (0, q_s^0) = \frac{c}{p - 0.5} \). Hence, \( V_r (0, q_s^0) \leq f \) is equivalent to \( f \geq \frac{c}{p - 0.5} \).

2. Equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition. First, consider the case of \( q_s = 0 \). It must be that \( q_r \in (0, 1) \). It cannot be that \( q_r = 0 \), since \( (q_r, q_s) = (0, 0) \) is not an equilibrium, as shown above. It cannot be that \( q_r = 1 \), since in that case no shareholder would be pivotal, so \( V_r (1, 0) = 0 < f \) for any \( f > 0 \). Thus, a shareholder would be better off deviating to staying uninformed. If \( q_r = 0 \), then \( V_s (0, 0) \leq c \) by Assumption 1, so a shareholder would be better off deviating to acquiring a private signal. For \( q_s = 0 \) and \( q_r \in (0, 1) \) to constitute an equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that \( V_s (q_r, 0) \leq c \) and \( V_r (q_r, 0) = f \). When \( q_s = 0 \), the probabilities of being pivotal are:

\[
\Omega_1 (q_r, 0) = P \left( \frac{1 + q_r}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N - 1}{2} \right) = P \left( \frac{1 - q_r}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N - 1}{2} \right) = \Omega_2 (q_r, 0) \equiv \Omega_r (q_r). \tag{18}
\]

Eq. \( V_r (q_r, 0) = f \) yields \( \Omega_r (q_r) = \frac{f}{\pi - 0.5} \). Equating to (18), we obtain that \( q_r \) is given by (13), which lies in \((0, 1)\) if \( f < C \frac{N - 1}{N - 1} \cdot \frac{1}{2} - N \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) \). Otherwise, no solution exists. Plugging \( \Omega_r (q_r) = \frac{f}{\pi - 0.5} \) into
c \geq V_s(q_r, 0), we obtain \( f \leq \frac{2\pi-1}{2p-1}c \). Note that
\[
C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}2^{1-N} \left( \pi - \frac{1}{2} \right) > \frac{2\pi - 1}{2p - 1}c \iff \frac{1}{4} > \left( \frac{c}{(p - \frac{1}{2})C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}},
\]
which is satisfied by Assumption 1. Hence, the equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition exists if and only if \( f \leq \bar{f} \).

3. Equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition.
Second, consider the case of \( q_s > 0 \). If \( q_r + q_s < 1 \) in equilibrium, then a shareholder must be indifferent between acquiring \( r \), acquiring \( s_i \), and staying uninformed. Hence, \( q_s \) and \( q_r \) must satisfy \( V_s(q_r, q_s) = c \) and \( V_r(q_r, q_s) = f \), which yields a system of linear equations for \( \Omega_1 \) and \( \Omega_2 \):
\[
\begin{align*}
\pi\Omega_1 + (1-\pi)\Omega_2 &= \frac{c}{p-0.5} \quad \iff \Omega_1 = f + \frac{c}{2p-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \Omega_2 = \frac{c}{2p-1} - f,
\end{align*}
\]
which is equivalent to the following system of equations for \( q_r \) and \( q_s \):
\[
\begin{align*}
\left( \frac{1}{2}q_r + \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) q_s \right)^2 &= \frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c}{2p-1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}},
\left( \frac{1}{2}q_r - \left( p - \frac{1}{2} \right) q_s \right)^2 &= \frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{\frac{c}{2p-1} - f}{(1-\pi)C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}}.
\end{align*}
\]
It has a solution if and only if the right-hand sides of both equations are non-negative, i.e., if \( f \in \left[ f_1, 2^{1-N} \pi C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}} - \frac{c}{2p-1} \right] \), where
\[
f_1 \equiv \frac{c}{2p-1} - 2^{1-N} (1-\pi) C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}, \tag{21}
\]
in which case there are two solutions:

1. Solution with \( q_r \leq (2p - 1) q_s \), denoted \((q_r^a, q_s^a)\):
\[
q_r^a = \frac{1}{2p-1} \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c}{2p-1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}}} + \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{\frac{c}{2p-1} - f}{(1-\pi)C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}}} \right),
\]
\[
q_r^a = \frac{1}{2p-1} \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c}{2p-1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}}} - \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{\frac{c}{2p-1} - f}{(1-\pi)C_{N-1}^{\frac{N+1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2}{N-1}}} \right).
\tag{22}
\]
2. Solution with \( q_r \geq (2p - 1) q_s \), denoted \((q_r^b, q_s^b)\):

\[
q_r^b = \sqrt{\frac{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c_s}{2p - 1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^+} \right) \frac{2}{N-1}}{1}} + \sqrt{\frac{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{\frac{c}{2p - 1} - f}{(1-\pi)C_{N-1}^+} \right) \frac{2}{N-1}}{1}}.
\]

\( q_s^b \) is given by (22) and \( q_r^b \) is given by (23), and given by (21), and for the conditions of existence of equilibrium with only private information acquisition and equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition, we get the statement of the lemma.

If \( q_r + q_s = 1 \) in equilibrium, then a shareholder must be indifferent between acquiring \( r \) and \( s_i \) and weakly prefer this over staying uninformed. Hence, \( q_s \) and \( q_r \) must satisfy \( V_s(q_r, q_s) - c = V_r(q_r, q_s) \), where \( V_r(q_r, q_s) \) is given by (21) and \( V_s(q_r, q_s) \) is given by (22). Each solution is an equilibrium if and only if it satisfies \( q_r > 0 \), \( q_s > 0 \), and \( q_r + q_s < 1 \). Each solution satisfies \( (q_r, q_s) > 0 \) if and only if \( f + \frac{c_r}{2p - 1} - f \) is positive. Also, since \( p \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \), it is easy to see that \( q_r^b + q_s^b \leq q_r^a + q_s^a \).

For any \( \psi \), these two equations lead to a system identical to (19), but with \( c + \psi \) and \( f + \psi \) instead of \( c \) and \( f \). It has a solution if and only if the right-hand sides of both equations are positive. In that case, it has two solutions, analogous to (22) and (23), and given by (24) and (25) in the Online Appendix.

To prove the lemma, we show the following sequence of three auxiliary claims, which are proved in the Online Appendix.

1. Claim 1: If \( f \geq \tilde{f} \), then there is no equilibrium \((q_r, q_s) > 0 \).

2. Claim 2: If \( \frac{2p}{2p-1} \sqrt{\frac{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c_s}{2p - 1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^+} \right) \frac{2}{N-1}}{1}} \leq 1 \), there is an equilibrium \((q_r, q_s) > 0 \) if and only if \( f \in [\tilde{f}_1, \tilde{f}] \), where \( \tilde{f}_1 \) is given by (21).

3. Claim 3: If \( \frac{2p}{2p-1} \sqrt{\frac{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f - \frac{c_r}{2p - 1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^+} \right) \frac{2}{N-1}}{1}} > 1 \), there exists \( f_2 \geq f_1 \) such that there is an equilibrium \((q_r, q_s) > 0 \) if and only if \( f \in [\tilde{f}_2, \tilde{f}] \).

Combining Claims 2 and 3, we conclude that there exists an equilibrium \((q_r, q_s) > 0 \) if and only if \( f \in [\tilde{f}, \tilde{f}] \), where

\[
f = \begin{cases} 
\tilde{f}_1 & \text{if } \frac{2p}{2p-1} \sqrt{\frac{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f + \frac{c_s}{2p - 1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^+} \right) \frac{2}{N-1}}{1}} \leq 1 \\
\tilde{f}_2 & \text{otherwise,}
\end{cases}
\]

where \( \tilde{f}_1 \) is given by (21) and \( \tilde{f}_2 \) is defined in Claim 3, respectively. Combining this condition and the conditions of existence of equilibrium with only private information acquisition and equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition, we get the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 3.

Consider an equilibrium defined by pair \( q_s \) and \( q_r \). Let \( U(q_s, q_r) \) denote the corresponding expected value of a proposal per share. By definition,

\[
U(q_s, q_r) = \mathbb{E}[u(1, \theta) d(N)] = \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N} v_j > \frac{N-1}{2} | \theta = 1 \right] - \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N} v_j > \frac{N-1}{2} | \theta = 0 \right] = \frac{1}{2} \pi \left( \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} P(p_a, N, k) - \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} P(1-p_a, N, k) \right) + \frac{1}{2} (1 - \pi) \left( \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} P(p_d, N, k) - \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} P(1-p_d, N, k) \right),
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
p_a & \equiv \Pr(v_t = \theta | r = \theta) = q_s + q_s p + \frac{1-q_s - q_s}{2} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} q_s + (p - \frac{1}{2}) q_s, \\
p_d & \equiv \Pr(v_t = \theta | r \neq \theta) = q_s p + \frac{1-q_s - q_s}{2} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} q_s + (p - \frac{1}{2}) q_s,
\end{align*}
\]

are the probabilities that a random shareholder votes correctly conditional on the proxy advisor’s recommendation being correct and incorrect, respectively. Using \( P(q, N, k) = P(1-q, N, N-k) \) and \( \sum_{k=0}^{N} P(q, N, k) = 1 \), the above expression simplifies to

\[
U(q_s, q_r) = \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} (\pi P(p_a, N, k) + (1-\pi) P(p_d, N, k)) - \frac{1}{2}. \tag{27}
\]

Proof of part 1. Note that the probability of a shareholder being pivotal in equilibrium with incomplete crowding out does not exceed that in the benchmark case:

\[
\pi P(p_a, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) + (1-\pi) P(p_d, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) = \pi \Omega_1(q_s, q_r) + (1-\pi) \Omega_2(q_s, q_r) \geq \frac{2c}{2p-1}.
\]

Indeed, it exactly equals \( \frac{2c}{2p-1} \) if \( q_s + q_r < 1 \) based on (19), and equals \( \frac{2c}{2p-1} \) if \( q_s + q_r = 1 \), where \( \psi \geq 0 \) is given by (24). Consider the following optimization problem:

\[
\max_{p_a, p_d} \sum_{k=N+1}^{2N+1} (\pi P(p_a, N, k) + (1-\pi) P(p_d, N, k)) - \frac{1}{2} \text{ s.to } \pi P(p_a, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) + (1-\pi) P(p_d, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \geq \frac{2c}{2p-1}. \tag{28}
\]

This optimization problem chooses the probabilities of a correct vote, \( p_a \) and \( p_d \), that maximize firm value subject to the “budget constraint” that the probability that a shareholder is pivotal, implied by \( p_a \) and \( p_d \), cannot be below \( \frac{2c}{2p-1}, \) i.e., that in the benchmark case. In what follows, we show that this optimization problem is solved by \( p_a = p_d = \frac{1}{2} + q_0^* (p - \frac{1}{2}) \), i.e., the same as in the benchmark case. Let \( x_a \equiv P(p_a, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \) and \( x_d \equiv P(p_d, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \). Let us define function \( \varphi(x) \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \) as the higher root of \( x = P(\varphi(x), N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) = C_{N-1}^{\frac{N-1}{2}} (\varphi(x)(1-\varphi(x)))^{\frac{N-1}{2}} \):

\[
\varphi(x) = \frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{x}{C_{N-1}^{\frac{N-1}{2}}} \right)^{\frac{2(N-1)}{N-1}}} \tag{29}
\]

Note that \( p_a > \frac{1}{2} \) and hence \( p_a = \varphi(x_a) \). If \( p_d > \frac{1}{2} \), then \( p_d = \varphi(x_d) \), and if \( p_d < \frac{1}{2} \), then
$p_d = 1 - \varphi(x_d)$. First, consider all equilibria with $p_d > \frac{1}{2}$. Then, we can rewrite (28) as:

$$
\max_{x_a, x_d} \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left( \pi P(\varphi(x_a), N, k) + \left(1 - \pi\right) P(\varphi(x_d), N, k) \right) - \frac{1}{2}
$$

subject to $\pi x_a + \left(1 - \pi\right) x_d \geq \frac{2c}{2p-1}$, \hspace{1cm} (30)

Auxiliary Lemma A1 at the end of the Appendix shows that function $f(x) \equiv \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(\varphi(x), N, k)$ is strictly decreasing in $x$. Thus, the constraint in (30) is binding. Auxiliary Lemma A1 also shows that $f(x)$ is strictly concave in $x$. Thus, by Jensen’s inequality, for any $x_a, x_d$ such that $\pi x_a + \left(1 - \pi\right) x_d = \frac{2c}{2p-1}$, we have

$$
\pi f(x_a) + (1 - \pi) f(x_d) < f(\pi x_a + (1 - \pi) x_d) = f\left(\frac{2c}{2p-1}\right).
$$

Therefore, there is a unique solution to the maximization problem (30), given by $x_a = x_d = \frac{2c}{2p-1}$, which gives firm value in the benchmark case. Hence, for any equilibrium with incomplete crowding out and $p_d > \frac{1}{2}$, firm value is strictly lower than in the benchmark case. Next, consider all equilibria with $p_d < \frac{1}{2}$. Note that $\sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(1-q, N, k) = \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(q, N, N-k) = 1 - \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(q, N, k)$. In addition, $\sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P_q(q, N, k) = -\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} P_q(q, N, k) > 0$ for $q > \frac{1}{2}$ because $P_q(q, N, k) = P(q, N, k) \frac{k-Nq}{(1-q)} < 0$ for any $k < \frac{N}{2}$ and $q < \frac{1}{2}$. Since $\sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P\left(\frac{1}{2}, N, k\right) = \frac{1}{2}$, it follows that $\sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(1-q, N, k) \leq \frac{1}{2} < \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(q, N, k)$ for $q > \frac{1}{2}$. Therefore,

$$
\sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left( \pi P(p_a, N, k) + (1 - \pi) P(p_d, N, k) \right) - \frac{1}{2} = \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} \left( \pi P(\varphi(x_a), N, k) + (1 - \pi) P(\varphi(x_d), N, k) \right) - \frac{1}{2}
$$

and the last expression, subject to the constraint in (30), has already been shown to be below firm value in the benchmark case. Hence, the quality of decision-making in any equilibrium with incomplete crowding out is strictly lower than in the benchmark case.

**Proof of part 2.** Next, we prove the second part of the proposition. In the equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition, we have

$$
\begin{align*}
p_a &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} g_r = \frac{1}{2} + \sqrt{\frac{f}{(\pi - \frac{1}{2})^2}} \frac{N^{-1}}{N^{-1}} \\
p_d &= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} g_r = \frac{1}{2} - \sqrt{\frac{f}{(\pi - \frac{1}{2})^2}} \frac{N^{-1}}{N^{-1}}
\end{align*}
$$

(31)

Since $p_d = 1 - p_a$, we can rewrite firm value as

$$
U = \pi \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(p_a, N, k) + (1 - \pi) \sum_{k=0}^{\frac{N-1}{2}} P(p_a, N, k) - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} - \pi + (2\pi - 1) \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(p_a, N, k).
$$
By (7) and (8), the expected value in the benchmark case without the advisor is given by 

\[ U = \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(p^*, N, k) - \frac{1}{2}, \]

where \( p^* = \frac{1}{2} + q_0^* (p - \frac{1}{2}) \). Firm value is higher with the advisor than without it if and only if

\[
(2\pi - 1) \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(p_a, N, k) - \pi > \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} P(p^*, N, k) - 1. \tag{32}
\]

In the Online Appendix, we show that the left-hand side of (32) is strictly increasing in \( \pi \), that (32) is violated for \( \pi \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} + \frac{f}{c} (p - \frac{1}{2}) \) and is satisfied for \( \pi \rightarrow 1 \). By monotonicity, there exists a unique \( \pi^* (f) \in (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{f}{c} (p - \frac{1}{2}), 1) \) such that the advisor’s presence increases firm value if and only if \( \pi \geq \pi^* (f) \).

**Proof of Lemma 2.** We start by defining \( \hat{c} \) in the statement of the lemma. Consider \((q_r^a, q_s^a)\) given by (22) and define

\[ S(f, c) \equiv q_r^a + q_s^a = \frac{2p}{2p - 1} \left[ \frac{1}{4} - \left( f + \frac{c}{(2p-1)\pi C_{N-1}^{N-1}} \right)^{\frac{\pi}{\pi-1}} \right] + \frac{2(1-p)}{2p - 1} \left[ \frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{c}{(1-\pi)C_{N-1}^{N-1}} - f \right)^{\frac{\pi}{\pi-1}} \right]. \]

Consider the following function of \( c \):

\[ V(c) \equiv \max_{f \in \left[ \bar{f}, \hat{f} (c) \right]} S(f, c), \tag{33} \]

where \( \bar{f} (c) = \frac{c}{2p-1} - 2^{1-N} (1-\pi) \frac{C_{N-1}^{N-1}}{C_{N-1}^{N-1}} \) and \( \hat{f} (c) = \frac{2\pi - 1}{2p-1} c \), as defined before. In the Online Appendix, we show that \( V(c) \) is strictly decreasing in \( c \). Note also that when \( c = \bar{c} \), defined in (7), then \( S(\hat{f}(\bar{c}), \bar{c}) = 1 \). Hence, \( V(\bar{c}) \geq 1 \). In addition, when \( c = \hat{c} \), defined in (7), then \( \hat{f}(\hat{c}) = f_1 (\hat{c}) \), and hence \( V(\hat{c}) = S(\hat{f}(\hat{c}), \hat{c}) = 0 \). Hence, there exists a unique \( \hat{c} \in [\bar{c}, \hat{c}] \) at which \( V(\hat{c}) = 1 \), and \( V(c) < 1 \) for any \( c \in (\hat{c}, \bar{c}) \). To sum up, we define \( \hat{c} \equiv V^{-1}(1) \), where \( V(c) \) is given by (6).

Suppose that \( c \in (\hat{c}, \bar{c}) \). Then, \( \frac{2p}{2p - 1} \left[ \frac{1}{4} - \left( \frac{f_1 (\hat{c}) + \frac{c}{2p-1}}{\pi C_{N-1}^{N-1}} \right)^{\frac{\pi}{\pi-1}} \right] = S(f_1 (\hat{c}), c) \leq V(c) < 1 \), and hence \( f = f_1 \) according to (25). According to Claim 2 in the proof of Lemma 1, there is an equilibrium \((q_r, q_s) > 0\) if and only if \( f \in [f, \hat{f}] \). Let us find all such equilibria. Since \( V(c) < 1 \), then \( q_r^a + q_s^a < 1 \) for any \( f \in [f, \hat{f}] \). Therefore, \( q_r^a + q_s^a \leq q_r^a + q_s^a < 1 \). In addition, \((q_r^a, q_s^a) > 0\) and \((q_r^b, q_s^b) > 0\) because \( f < f \). Thus, both equilibria (22) and (23) exist. Since \( q_r^1 (\psi) + q_s^1 (\psi) \) is strictly decreasing in \( \psi \) and \( q_r^1 (0) + q_s^1 (0) = q_r^a + q_s^a < 1 \), we have \( q_r^2 (\psi) + q_s^2 (\psi) \leq q_r^1 (\psi) + q_s^1 (\psi) < 1 \) for any \( \psi \geq 0 \), where \((q_i^1 (\psi), q_i^1 (\psi)) \), \( i = 1, 2 \), represent potential solutions for \( q_r + q_s = 1 \) and are given by (??) and (??) in the Online Appendix. Therefore, there is no equilibrium with \( q_r + q_s = 1 \) when \( f \in [f, \hat{f}] \). Thus, in addition to equilibrium with complete crowding out, there exist exactly two other equilibria when \( f \in [f, \hat{f}] \), and these equilibria feature incomplete crowding out with \( q_r + q_s < 1 \): (22) with \( q_r^a \leq (2p - 1) q_s^a \) and (23) with \( q_r^b \geq (2p - 1) q_s^b \).

The expected welfare of a shareholder is the expected per-share value of the proposal, \( U (q_s, q_r) \),
given by \((27)\), minus the expected information acquisition cost:

\[
W(q_s, q_r) = \sum_{k=\frac{N+1}{2}}^{N} (\pi P(p_a, N, k) + (1 - \pi) P(p_d, N, k)) - \frac{1}{2} - q_r f - q_s c. \tag{34}
\]

In the Online Appendix, we rank these three equilibria in shareholder welfare and show that the equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition and \(q_r < (2p - 1) q_s\) has the highest shareholder welfare, followed by the equilibrium with incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition and \(q_r > (2p - 1) q_s\), which is followed by the equilibrium with complete crowding out of private information acquisition.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** The proposition directly follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Note also that given \(c > \hat{c}\) in Assumption 2, we have \(\underline{f} = \underline{f}_1\), where \(\underline{f}_1\) is given by \((21)\).

**Proof of Proposition 5.** Consider the first statement of the proposition. The first part of Proposition 3 implies that if equilibrium features incomplete crowding out, then firm value is strictly lower than in the benchmark case. Hence, to find the conditions under which firm value is higher with the advisor, it is sufficient to find conditions under which the advisor sets fee in a way that crowds out private information acquisition. In case of complete crowding out, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the fee \(f\) set by the advisor and the fraction \(q_r^H(f)\) buying its recommendation, where \(q_r^H(f)\) is given by \((13)\). Moreover, recall that the value of the advisor’s signal to a shareholder is given by \(V_r(q_r, 0) = (\pi - \frac{1}{2})P(\frac{1+q_r}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2})\) and must be equal to \(f\). Thus, in this case, the advisor’s problem is equivalent to maximizing \(q_r V_r(q_r, 0)\) over \(q_r\). Hence, instead of choosing fee \(f\) and maximizing \(f q_r^H(f)\), the advisor can choose \(q_r\) and maximize \(\eta(q_r) = P(\frac{1+q_r}{2}, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2})q_r = C^{\frac{N-1}{2}} \left(\frac{(1+q)(1-q)}{4}\right)^{\frac{N-1}{2}}q\). Note that

\[
\frac{d\eta}{dq} = \text{const} \times \frac{d}{dq} \left[ q \left( 1 - q^2 \right)^{\frac{N-1}{2}} \right] = \text{const} \times \left( 1 - q^2 \right)^{\frac{N-3}{2}} \left( 1 - Nq^2 \right).
\]

Hence, \(\eta(q)\) is inverted U-shaped in \(q\) with a maximum at \(q_m = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\). The optimal fraction \(q_m = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}}\) translates into the optimal fee given by \((15)\). The fact that \(\eta(q)\) is inverse U-shaped in \(q\) implies that under complete crowding out, the advisor’s revenue is maximized at \(f = f_m\) and is monotonically decreasing as \(f\) gets farther from \(f_m\) in both directions. Hence, the optimal pricing strategy of the advisor if \(f_m \geq f\) is to either set \(f = f - \varepsilon, \varepsilon \to 0\), or to choose the fee that maximizes its revenue under incomplete crowding out, where \(f = \underline{f}_1\) is given by \((21)\). In the second case, firm value is lower than in the benchmark case according to Proposition 3. In the first case, firm value converges to firm value under complete crowding out and \(f = \underline{f}_1\). In the Online Appendix, we show that when \(f = \underline{f}_1\), firm value in equilibrium with complete crowding out is strictly lower than in equilibrium with incomplete crowding out, which (by Proposition 3) is in turn lower than firm value in the benchmark case. Therefore, the only case where firm value can be higher than in the benchmark case is when \(f_m < f = \underline{f}_1\), so that the advisor chooses fee \(f_m\). The constraint \(f_m < \underline{f}_1\)
can be simplified to
\[
\pi > \hat{\pi} \equiv \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + \frac{C_{N-1}^{N-1}}{C_{N-1}^{N-1} 2^{1-N} - \frac{2c}{2^{p-1}}} \right).
\]

If each shareholder acquires the advisor’s signal with probability \( q_r \) and remains uninformed otherwise, expected firm value is given by
\[
V^*(\pi, q_r) = \Pr(\theta = 1) \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} \left[ \pi P \left( q_r + \frac{1-q_r}{2}, N, k \right) + (1 - \pi) P \left( \frac{1-q_r}{2}, N, k \right) \right] \\
- \Pr(\theta = 0) \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} \left[ \pi P \left( \frac{1-q_r}{2}, N, k \right) + (1 - \pi) P \left( q_r + \frac{1-q_r}{2}, N, k \right) \right] \\
= (\pi - \frac{1}{2}) \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} \left[ P \left( \frac{1+q_r}{2}, N, k \right) - P \left( \frac{1-q_r}{2}, N, k \right) \right] \\
= (2\pi - 1) \left[ \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1+q_r}{2}, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right].
\]

Plugging \( q_r = \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \) in (35) and comparing it with \( V_0 \), we get
\[
(2\pi - 1) \left[ \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right] > V_0 = \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \\
= \pi^* - \frac{1}{2} \iff \pi > \hat{\pi} \equiv \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right). \tag{36}
\]

In the Online Appendix, we compare \( \hat{\pi} \) and \( \bar{\pi} \) and show that \( \hat{\pi} \leq \bar{\pi} \iff g \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \right) \leq g \left( \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda \right) \) is satisfied if and only if \( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \geq \frac{1}{2} + \Lambda \iff \Lambda \leq \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \). Note also that \( \Lambda \leq \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \iff \bar{\pi} \leq 1 \), as follows from (36). Hence, if \( \Lambda \leq \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \), then \( \hat{\pi} \leq \bar{\pi} \) and \( \bar{\pi} \leq 1 \), so the advisor improves the quality of decision-making compared to the benchmark case if and only if \( \pi > \hat{\pi} \). If \( \Lambda > \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \), then \( \hat{\pi} > \bar{\pi} \) and \( \bar{\pi} \geq 1 \), so the advisor never improves the quality of decision-making. Hence, in both cases, the advisor improves the quality of decision-making compared to the benchmark case if and only if \( \pi > \bar{\pi} \).

It remains to prove the second part of the proposition. Using (17), \( \bar{\pi} \) exceeds one if and only if
\[
\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\pi^* - \frac{1}{2}}{2\sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right)} > 1 \iff \pi^* > \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right).
\]

By definition, \( \pi^* = \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( p_0, N, k \right) \), where \( p_0 \equiv p_{q_0^*} + \frac{1-q_0^*}{2} > \frac{1}{2} \). As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, \( \sum_{k=\frac{N}{2}}^{N} P \left( q, N, k \right) > 0 \) for \( q > \frac{1}{2} \) and hence this inequality is equivalent to \( p_0 > \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}} \). Simplifying, we get \( (2p-1) q_0^* > \frac{1}{\sqrt{N}} \).

**Proof of Proposition 6.** Let \( f^*(\Delta) \) denote the equilibrium fee that the advisor charges. Consider part 1 of the proposition. Since \( q_r + q_s < 1 \) by Assumption 2, then \( f^*(\Delta) = \arg \max_{f} f q_r^L (f - \Delta) \), where \( q_r^L \) is given by (22). Using a change of variable \( \phi \equiv f - \Delta \), we have:
\[
f^*(\Delta) = \Delta + \arg \max_{\phi} (\phi + \Delta) q_r^L (\phi).
\]
The cross-partial derivative of the maximized function is \( \frac{\partial q_r^H(\phi)}{\partial \phi} < 0 \). By Topkis' theorem, the maximizer \( \phi \), denoted \( \phi^*(\Delta) \), is decreasing in \( \Delta \). It follows that the equilibrium probability that a shareholder acquires information from the advisor, \( q_r^H(\phi^*(\Delta)) \), increases in \( \Delta \). Hence, according to (26), \( p_a - p_d = q_r \) increases in \( \Delta \). By the argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 3, firm value decreases in \( \Delta \). Indeed, since \( q_r + q_s < 1 \), a marginal increase in \( \Delta \) increases the distance between \( x_a = P(p_a, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \) and \( x_d = P(p_d, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \), while keeping the total probability of being pivotal, \( \pi x_a + (1 - \pi) x_d \), unchanged at \( \frac{2e}{2^p-1} \). According to (27), firm value equals \( \pi f(x_a) + (1 - \pi) f(x_d) - \frac{1}{2} \), where \( f(x) = \sum_{k=N+1}^N P(\varphi(x), N, k) \) and \( \varphi(x) \) is defined by (29). Since, according to Auxiliary Lemma A1, function \( \tilde{f}(x) \) is concave, firm value decreases with the distance between \( x_a \) and \( x_d \) when \( \pi x_a + (1 - \pi) x_d \) remains unchanged, and hence decreases with \( \Delta \).

Consider part 2 of the proposition. In this case, \( f^*(\Delta) = f + \Delta \), and hence \( q_r = q_r^H(f^*(\Delta) - \Delta) = q_r^H(f) \). Thus, both \( q_r \) and \( q_s = 0 \) are unaffected by a marginal change in \( \Delta \), and hence firm value is unaffected by \( \Delta \) as well.

Finally, consider part 3 of the proposition. In this case, \( f^*(\Delta) = \arg \max_{\varphi} f q_r^H(f - \Delta) \). Using a change of variable \( \phi \equiv f - \Delta \), we have:

\[
f^*(\Delta) = \Delta + \arg \max_{\phi} (\phi + \Delta) q_r^H(\phi).
\]

Since the cross-partial derivative of the maximized function \( \left( \frac{\partial q_r^H(\phi)}{\partial \phi} \right) \) is negative, the maximizer \( \phi^* \), denoted \( \phi^*(\Delta) \), is decreasing in \( \Delta \). Therefore, the equilibrium probability that a shareholder acquires information from the advisor, \( q_r^H(\phi^*(\Delta)) \), increases in \( \Delta \). As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, \( \sum_{k=N+1}^N P_q(q, N, k) > 0 \) for \( q > \frac{1}{2} \) and hence, according to (35), firm value increases in \( \Delta \).

**Proof of Proposition 7.** First, suppose that complete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs in equilibrium. Then \( q_r = q_r^H(f) \) is given by (13), and a marginal decrease in \( f \) increases \( q_r \). The expected value of the proposal is given by (35). As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, \( \sum_{k=N+1}^N P_q(q, N, k) > 0 \) for \( q > \frac{1}{2} \) and hence expected value increases when \( f \) decreases. Next, consider the case of incomplete crowding out of private information acquisition. Since \( q_r + q_s < 1 \) by Assumption 2, \( (q_r, q_s) \) are given by (22). A marginal decrease in \( f \) increases \( q_r \) and hence, according to (26), \( p_a - p_d = q_r \) increases. By the argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 3, firm value increases in \( f \). Indeed, a marginal decrease in \( f \) increases the distance between \( x_a = P(p_a, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \) and \( x_d = P(p_d, N - 1, \frac{N-1}{2}) \), while keeping the total probability of being pivotal, \( \pi x_a + (1 - \pi) x_d \), unchanged at \( \frac{2e}{2^p-1} \). According to (27), firm value equals \( \pi f(x_a) + (1 - \pi) f(x_d) - \frac{1}{2} \), where \( f(x) = \sum_{k=N+1}^N P(\varphi(x), N, k) \) and \( \varphi(x) \) is defined by (29). Since, according to Auxiliary Lemma A1, function \( \tilde{f}(x) \) is concave, firm value decreases with the distance between \( x_a \) and \( x_d \) when \( \pi x_a + (1 - \pi) x_d \) remains unchanged, and hence decreases when \( f \) decreases.

**Proof of Proposition 8.** Note that \( \pi^* \) is the equilibrium probability of making a correct decision in the benchmark model without the advisor.

1. First, consider \( \pi \leq \pi^* \). If the fee satisfies \( f \geq \tilde{f} \), Lemma 1 implies that shareholders do not buy the advisor’s recommendation, and hence firm value equals \( V_0 \), which is firm value in the
we want to prove that under each of the conditions of the proposition, the advisor’s recommendation leads to a strictly higher firm value. As the fee, so to maximize the number of informed shareholders and thereby firm value, it would be optimal to set the fee as low as possible in this range. As the fee converges to one, i.e., all shareholders buy the advisor’s recommendation, (13) implies that the fraction of shareholders buying the advisor’s recommendation monotonically decreases in the fee, so to maximize the number of informed shareholders and thereby firm value, it would be optimal to set the fee as low as possible in this range. As $f$ converges to zero, (13) implies that $q_r$ converges to one, i.e., all shareholders buy the advisor’s recommendation. Hence, the probability of making a correct decision converges to $\pi$, which is strictly higher than $\pi^*$, the probability of making a correct decision in the benchmark case. Thus, indeed, the fee that maximizes firm value is arbitrarily close to zero.

**Proof of Proposition 9.** We first show that if the precision of the advisor’s signal is not disclosed, the equilibrium of the game is the same as in the basic model but where the precision of the advisor’s signal is the expected value of $\pi$, $\tilde{\pi} \equiv \mu_l \pi_l + \mu_h \pi_h$. Indeed, fix the equilibrium probabilities $q_r$ and $q_s$ with which each shareholder acquires the advisor’s signal and his private signal, and consider the information acquisition decision of any shareholder, taking the strategies of other shareholders as given. Denote $V_s(q_r, q_s, \pi)$ and $V_r(q_r, q_s, \pi)$ the shareholder’s values from acquiring the private and public signal, respectively, if the precision of the advisor’s signal is known to be $\pi$. These values are given by expressions (9) and (10). Then, the values from acquiring the private and public signal if the shareholder does not know the realization of $\pi$ are $\hat{V}_s \equiv \mu_l V_s(q_r, q_s, \pi_l) + \mu_h V_s(q_r, q_s, \pi_h)$ and $\hat{V}_r \equiv \mu_l V_r(q_r, q_s, \pi_l) + \mu_h V_r(q_r, q_s, \pi_h)$. Because, $\Omega_1(q_r, q_s)$ and $\Omega_2(q_r, q_s)$ do not depend on $\pi$, (9) and (10) imply that $V_s(q_r, q_s, \pi)$ and $V_r(q_r, q_s, \pi)$ are linear in $\pi$. Hence, $\hat{V}_s = V_h(q_r, q_s, \tilde{\pi})$ and $\hat{V}_r = V_r(q_r, q_s, \tilde{\pi})$. This proves that the equilibrium of the game without disclosure coincides with the equilibrium of the basic model with precision $\tilde{\pi}$.

Denote $V^*(\pi)$ the expected value of the proposal in the equilibrium of the basic model when the precision of the advisor’s signal is $\pi$. The argument above implies that the expected value of the proposal in the game without disclosure is given by $V^*(\tilde{\pi})$. Since the expected value of the proposal in the game with disclosure is $\mu_l V^*(\frac{1}{2}) + \mu_h V^*(\pi_h)$ and since $V^*(\frac{1}{2}) = V_0$, given by (8), we want to prove that under each of the conditions of the proposition, $\mu_l V_0 + \mu_h V^*(\pi_h) > V^*(\tilde{\pi})$.

Consider the first condition, i.e., suppose that $V^*(\pi_h) > V_0$. First, if $\tilde{\pi}$ is such that $V^*(\tilde{\pi}) > V_0$, we have $\mu_l V_0 + \mu_h V^*(\pi_h) > V_0 \geq V^*(\tilde{\pi})$, as required. Second, consider $\tilde{\pi}$ such that $V^*(\tilde{\pi}) > V_0$. The proof of Proposition 5 implies that this can only be true if $\tilde{\pi} > \pi$ and $f^* = f_m$, and hence
\( V^*(\bar{\pi}) \) is given by (16). Since \( V^*(\pi_h) > V_0 \), \( V^*(\pi_h) \) is also given by (16). Hence,

\[
V^*(\bar{\pi}) = (2\bar{\pi} - 1) \left( \sum_{k=N+1}^N P\left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right) = \mu_{h} \left( 2\pi_h - 1 \right) \left( \sum_{k=N+1}^N P\left( \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{N}}, N, k \right) - \frac{1}{2} \right) = \mu_{h} V^*(\pi_h) < \mu_{l} V_0 + \mu_{h} V^*(\pi_h),
\]
as required.

Next, consider the second condition of the proposition. If \( V^*(\pi_h) > V_0 \), then the first condition of the proposition, which has been proved above to be sufficient, applies. Hence, consider \( V^*(\pi_h) \leq V_0 \). Since complete crowding out of private information acquisition occurs for \( \bar{\pi} \), it also occurs for \( \pi_h \) since \( \pi_h > \bar{\pi} \). In the range of complete crowding out of private information acquisition, the quality of decision-making \( V^*(\pi) \) is strictly increasing in \( \pi \), and hence \( V^*(\pi_h) > V^*(\bar{\pi}) \). Hence, \( \mu_{l} V_0 + \mu_{h} V^*(\pi_h) \geq V^*(\pi_h) > V^*(\bar{\pi}) \), as required.

**Auxiliary Lemma A1.** Function \( f(x) \equiv \sum_{k=N+1}^N P(\varphi(x), N, k) \), where \( \varphi(x) \) is defined by (29), is strictly decreasing and strictly concave. The proof is relegated to the Online Appendix.